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ABSTRACT 
System requirements are typically specified on the assumption that the system's 
operating environment will behave in what is considered to be an expected and nominal 
manner. When gathering requirements, one concern is whether the requirements are too 
ambiguous to account for every possible, unintended, Off-Nominal Behavior (ONB) that the 
operating environment can create, which results in an undesired system state. In this 
dissertation, we present two automated approaches which can expose, within a set of embedded 
requirements, whether an ONB can result in an undesired system state. Both approaches 
employ a modeling technique developed as part of this dissertation called the Causal 
Component Model (CCM).  
The first approach described, uses model checking as the means of property checking 
requirements using temporal logic properties specifically created to oppose ONBs. To facilitate 
the use of model checking by requirements engineers and non-technical stakeholders who are 
the system domain experts, a framework for the model checker interface was developed using 
the CCM. The CCM serves as both a cognitive friendly input and output to the model checker. 
The second approach extends the CCM into a dedicated ONB property checker, which 
overcomes the limitations of the model checker, by not only exposing ONBs but also 
facilitating the correction of those ONBs. We demonstrate how both approaches can expose and 
help correct potential Off-Nominal Behavior problems using requirements that represent real-
world products. Our case studies show that both approaches can expose a system’s 
susceptibility to ONBs and provide enough information to correct the potential problems that 
can be caused by those ONBs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Motivation 
The motivation behind the research presented in this dissertation was the result of three major 
observations made from working within the embedded software industry. The first observation is that 
vehicles such as tractors and skid loaders can experience undesired behaviors, due to human operators 
behaving in an unintended manner, what is hence referred to as the Off Nominal Behavior Problem 
(ONBP). The second observation is that to address the ONBP during the requirements phase, 
stakeholders that are domain expects, best familiar with nominal behaviors, should be involved. The 
third observation is that if one was to attempt to involve all stakeholders, it would have to be done in a 
way that can be readily used by industry, which includes a minimal learning curve. This dissertation 
describes how various areas of research, combined with the mentioned observations, led to addressing 
the ONBP in a way that allows for stakeholder involvement using an industry-friendly approach. This 
dissertation describes two approaches to addressing the ONBP, both revolving around a developed 
modeling technique called Causal Component Modeling. The first approach takes a Property Checking 
Approach (PCA), the second approach is referred to as the State Profiling Approach (SPA). We begin 
by defining the Off Nominal Behavior Problem. 
The Off-Nominal Behavior Problem 
While all activities in the software development life cycle should be carefully performed to 
build high quality and reliable software, the requirements engineering phase is a very important and 
critical phase since it has a large bearing on whether the system-to-be is correctly implemented [3, 4]. It 
is well known that catching an error in the later stage of software development is usually more time 
consuming and costly than if the error is caught in the early stage [10, 11, 12, 13].  For instance, Boehm 
and Basili [10] indicate that finding and correcting defects after product release is often 100 times more 
expensive than correcting them during the requirements and modeling phase. Also, one survey 
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performed by Hofmann and Lehner [14] found that successful IT projects have spent about 28% of the 
effort on the requirements phase. 
Much research has been performed in developing ways to verify whether a set of requirements is 
correct (verification) and will result in the system desired by the stakeholders (validation). Lack of 
adequate specifications is often due to incompleteness, ambiguities [1], and inconsistencies [61] that 
commonly occur in a set of natural language (NL) requirements. There are also errors due to the 
inadequate anticipation of Off-Nominal Behaviors (ONB) produced by the system’s operating 
environment. An Off Nominal Behavior (ONB) is a behavior that is not within the realm of an intended 
behavior. In the literature, an Off Nominal Behavior is often defined as a situation in which an 
equipment operator, such as an airline pilot, behaves in a manner that was not intended by the designers 
of the equipment in question [155]. The machine, having an intended normal mode of operation, is then 
placed in a potentially unsafe situation. As it applies to a set of embedded requirements, an ONB is a 
behavior that was not anticipated for by the requirements and typically results in undesired states. 
If we view a system as a state transition system, where system states are connected by transitions 
caused by both the environment and the system itself, then an ONB is a behavior in the operating 
environment that results in the system transitioning into an undesired state from which it has not been 
designed to recover from. Undesired states are not necessarily states that create a safety hazard, but can 
also be states that were not intended by a given sequence of transitions. For example, in a system 
consisting of two sensors and a push button, the following ONB scenarios can occur: 
1) A sensor gets stuck, producing the same input voltage continuously and consequently 
restricting all possible system state transitions to a subset of the system’s entire state space. This 
scenario can lead to the system getting a state that was not intended, given the sequence of actions 
produced by the environment.  
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2) A push button switch is pressed and released in rapid succession, resulting in the 
operator inducing a state transition faster than the system. This scenario can also occur if the system is 
slower than usual in responding to an action from the environment. In this case, the system can end up in 
a state other than the state the system would have transitioned to, had the system responded in a timely 
manner. 
3) Two sensors causing two different transitions from the same state at the same exact 
time. This introduces an element of unpredictability. The problem arises when sensor A and sensor B 
can cause a transition from a given state to two different states and it is sensor A that is the intended 
cause of the transition, but somehow sensor B interfered and became the cause instead of A. 
Note that in the above scenarios, part of the question is one of a system’s susceptibility to an 
ONB. For example, in the third scenario (item 3, above), the goal would be to expose the possibility of 
this scenario occurring. In this case, the analysis would expose system states that have two competing 
environmental causes. In the second scenario (item2), the analysis would expose states where an 
environmental cause is competing with a system cause, which amounts to; exposing the system’s 
susceptibility to ONBs from the environment. 
Armstrong et al. have addressed the ONB problem by studying how human operators interact 
with machinery, and why they may deviate from an intended operating procedure [149]. The result is 
more of an ergonomic, psychological approach to the prevention of an ONB problem. An alternative 
approach is to make the equipment more robust, or “foolproof,” so that in spite of an operator’s off 
nominal behavior, the equipment cannot be placed in an undesired state of operation. Of the two 
approaches just mentioned, this research addresses the ONB problem from the system’s perspective. To 
be specific, the goal here is to give stakeholders an indication of how susceptible a given set of 
embedded requirements is to the environment causing an undesired state. This is a form of “fool-
proofing” the system against an ONB problem.  
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Limitations in Addressing Off-Nominal Behavior Problem 
Limitations in addressing ONBP can be summarized as follows. The majority of the efforts in 
addressing the ONBP is to either minimize a human operator’s unpredictable reaction to an off-nominal 
situation, (such as may arise in a busy airport runway scenario) or perform off-nominal testing in a 
finished product. Addressing ONBP from the human’s standpoint emphasizes that most ONBPs are 
perceived as originating from human behavior within the system’s operating environment.  This places 
the focus of the solution within the operating environment and less within the system itself. While 
addressing ONBs in the environment should still be addressed, ultimately, regardless of the 
environment’s behavior, an ONB can become a problem if the system allows the ONB to have an 
adverse effect in how the system achieves it designed objective. Thus, more effort should be made in 
addressing how the system reacts to and recovers from an ONB. In doing so the system is made more 
robust and foolproof.  
Addressing the ONBP from the standpoint of off-nominal testing emphasizes that some ONBPs 
are addressed as an after-thought, after the system has been designed and implemented. While off-
nominal testing should still be performed in highly safety critical systems, more effort should be made in 
addressing ONBs early in the development cycle. A preferred phase would be the requirements phase 
where access to the system domain expert is more readily made.  Stakeholders, such as domain experts, 
are a good source of information when addressing what can go wrong during a human operator’s use of 
a system.  
There is also a limitation in how ONBs are exposed and accounted for. This is due to the fact 
that many ONBs are anticipated by human manual assessment. Little has been done in automating the 
process of exposing ONBs, with the few efforts using a formal approach such as model checking [4, 6], 
which is not readily conductive to use during the requirements phase. Thus, there is a need for cognitive 
friendly and industry friendly approaches to the ONBP. Cognitive friendliness enables the non-technical 
stakeholders to get directly involved, reducing the strict role of the requirements engineer as the 
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middleman, and instead allowing both requirements engineer and stakeholders to work as collaborators. 
The requirement engineer and stakeholders can then produce the specification without the need for 
extensive experience and training in formal methods, while gaining the incremental feedback that an 
automatic methodology can provide.  
However, achieving industry-friendliness has its own set of challenges. Having reviewed a good 
portion of the proposed methodologies and tools meant to improve the deficiencies in requirements 
engineering, and comparing those proposals to the real-world mindset of the requirements engineers and 
their managers, the following major observation is drawn. Most everyone in the software industry 
recognizes the need to improve the way requirements are performed, be it the IT or the embedded world; 
however, most hesitate to adapted automated and tool-based solutions, beyond those that manage the 
elicitation, and the basic inspection of requirements.  
The major reasons for this hesitation are time and money. Both of which are needed to train 
personnel, and convert the policies and procedures, to a different way of doing things. This resistance to 
change is further enforced by the fact that a lot of the proposed improvements coming out of academic 
research require an amount of time and effort to understanding and implement beyond what most 
managers are willing to invest. Yes, there are software companies, such as those with a CMMI level 5 
that would invest the time and effort in order to formally improve the way they perform requirements. 
But this represents a smaller percentage of the industry, and they tend to hire personnel that are trained 
in the area of formal methods.  
In part, the motivation behind this research is to develop a methodology that requires a minimal 
amount of time and money to introduce into an industry setting, while affording the defect-exposing 
capacities of a formal method. Toward this end, the two proposed approaches have been developed as a 
cognitive friendly approach that can be ultimately used with an existing tool, such as Matlab/Simulink. 
In the meantime, a stand-alone support tool has been developed, which implements the steps involved in 
exposing and removing ONB susceptibility. The tool also provides various graphical representations of 
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the process steps, in order to allow engineers and non-technical stakeholders direct interaction with the 
tool.  
Contributions of this Research 
This research has produced two approaches that are both cognitive friendly to both technical and 
non-technical stakeholders, and is able to determine whether a system, as specified, can be placed in an 
undesired or unintended state by off-nominal behaviors in the operating environment. This has resulted 
in other, secondary, contributions that can be extended into future research endeavors. They are listed 
here: 
1) A means to bridge the gap between (informal) natural language requirements and their formal 
representation through an ease-of-use requirements model called the Causal Component Model 
(CCM). The CCM can capture system behavior as expressed in a set of requirements. It is cognitive 
friendly for three reasons:  
a. The CCM focuses on what a system is supposed to do, and not how it is supposed to do it. 
Quite often engineers will think ahead, and begin to incorporate a design approach during 
the specifying of requirements. This produces requirements that specify how a system is to 
be designed, something better suited for the design phase. The CCM forces the focus on 
what the system is supposed to do, which is more in line with the mindset of non-technical 
stakeholders, particularly domain expects who have a better understanding of what the 
system is supposed to do. 
b. The construction of the CCM involves a simple four step process, which focuses on the 
identification of system components and their respective states. We call these component 
states, which are readily identifiable by technical and non-technical stakeholders alike. 
c. The ability to model various levels of abstraction. This affords a stakeholder the ability to 
model the system as they best conceive it, as well as help manage the size of the model. 
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2) A rules-based language for the CCM, which allows for the automated manipulation of the CCM. 
The CCM rules can also be used to systematically convert a CCM into Labeled Transition System 
with global system states and/or into a Petri-Net.  
3) The CCM rules can be used to create an expert system from a set of requirements. Such an expert 
system can then be queried via forward chaining or backward chaining, allowing for further analysis 
of the requirements. 
As further contributions from this research we have developed a means of using the CCM to graphically 
interpret counterexamples produced by a model checker, as well a means to translate a corrected CCM 
into a set of structured language requirements. In summary, the goal is to provide the requirements 
engineering community with a modeling “framework” that can be used to automatically expose and help 
correct a system’s adverse reaction to ONBs as early as the requirements phase.   
Dissertation Outline 
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide the background information 
required to put this research in its proper context, and the related work that has been previously 
performed. In Chapter 3,  we present the research groundwork that was performed in route to the 
development of the two proposed CCM based-approaches. Chapter 4 presents an overview of the CCM 
and how it can be applied. This overview will help the reader better understand subsequent chapters as 
well as provide a definition of terms. Chapter 5 provides an overview of the CCM-based Property 
Checking Approach (PCA), along with a case study that demonstrates the PCA’s  ability to expose 
ONBs. Chapter 6, presents the CCM-centric State Profiling Approach (SPA), and provides a case study 
demonstrating how SPA can expose an ONB and suggest a solution. Chapter 7 concludes with a 
summary of the research, some lessons learned, and possible future research directions.  
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BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
This section provides the background information needed to better understand the concepts 
introduced in this dissertation. We begin by reviewing some of the common issues that arise in the area 
of requirements engineering. 
Issues in Requirements Engineering  
It is well recognized that requirements engineering is the most important and critical phase to 
achieving success [54, 68]. Catching an error in the later stage of software development is usually more 
time consuming and costly than if the error is caught in the early stage [16, 66, 77]. Yet in spite of its 
importance, the requirements engineering phase of any given project is often the most neglected. The 
problem can stem from non-favorable perceptions about requirements [100]. An informal survey of 
software engineering students, by the author, while teaching a requirements class, found that none of the 
students had any intention of focusing their future career in the area of requirements engineering. Some 
of the reasons given were “I’m not going to school to learn how to write documents, but how to write 
code.” Another student expressed that they would rather spend the day “Dealing with a computer than 
dealing with people” [as in stakeholders, and customers]. These perceptions can sometimes extend 
beyond graduation into industry. 
Engineering will sometimes view the requirements document as a living document subject to 
“many changes to come.” That being the case, some may question whether it is productive to spend time 
compiling, writing, and reviewing something that will need to be revised again and again. Project 
management will sometimes perceive that progress is not being made until the system enters the design 
and implementation phase [100]. Subsequently, projects are often budgeted with more time and money 
allocated to software implementation and testing than to the requirements phase [101]. Part of what 
drives the desire to “Start coding as soon as possible” is that people tend to become engineers because 
they want to solve problems; they prefer to work in the solution domain.  
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This is where the act of designing and coding takes place. Requirements engineering, by 
contrast, operates in the problem domain [93]; its goal is to define and understand the problem 
thoroughly enough to produce the best-fit solution. Due to a human trait known as Optimistic Bias [69] 
there is often a tendency to feel that a problem has been understood well enough to start making 
progress on the solution. However, less time spent in the problem domain, means less time spent 
understanding the problem. There is also an interesting observation made by renowned computer 
scientist Frederick P. Brooks [70, 71]; he states something that all engineers know from firsthand 
experience, but often fail to consider due to their optimistic bias. That is, the lesson learned from 
examining many projects is that we can’t truly understand the problem we are solving until we actually 
start working on the solution [71]. The human mind needs to see a solution’s attempt at addressing a 
problem, in order to overcome the optimistic bias and get a real sense of the problem’s true difficulty 
level and the challenges that need to be addressed. 
This suggests that we can’t fully define requirements until we start designing. This may seem to 
justify the idea of spending as little time as possible in requirements, and get on with design and coding. 
However, there is still the fact that, compared to the requirements phase, errors in design cost 3-6 times 
more to fix, while the cost during implementation can be up to 10 times more. Dr. Brooks suggestion is 
not to spend less time in the requirements phase, but to extend the requirements phase to include more 
analysis and even some design in the form of a throw away prototype [70, 71]. In this approach a 
prototype, and the valuable information learned from interacting with it, is used to clearly define the 
requirements. Akin to developing a prototype is the modeling of requirements.  
Various tools now exist that capture requirements in the form of a modeling language, do some 
degree of validation, and then generate code automatically [88]. Such tools enable the engineer to spend 
more time understanding the problem domain, and perhaps even eliminate the ambiguity-prone natural 
language document all together. Some of this research includes more ways to use the classic Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) technique of knowledge representation and reasoning. This means that requirements 
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engineering has been trending toward the use of requirements modeling and the automatic analysis of 
the resulting models via computer.  
Verification/Validation  
Requirements engineering is often described as consisting of four phases: elicitation, analysis 
(sometimes referred to as negotiation), documentation, and verification/validation. For our purposes, 
verification asks “Are we specifying the system-to-be correctly?”, while validation asks, “Are we 
specifying the correct system. While it is recognized that sufficient time should be spent in all four 
phases that is not typically the case in the real world. Elicitation (the gathering of requirements) and its 
subsequent documentation is a necessity, and thus are always performed. Analysis is often bypassed or 
merged with the design phase. Verification/Validation often amounts to just human inspection of the 
requirements document by the stakeholders.  
While it can be argued that verification can be perform during the later development phases (at 
perhaps a greater expense), Validation should definitely occur in the requirements phase to assure that 
the system desired by the stakeholders is correctly specified. To date, many researchers and practitioners 
have proposed and developed numerous requirements validation techniques to improve requirements 
verification/validation processes and their effectiveness, such as reviews, inspections, prototyping, and 
formal methods [6, 7, 17, 42, 55]. Most organizations will, at least, conduct inspections of the 
requirements document and/or models [6, 86, 87].  The most commons defects found in a set of 
requirements can be classified as incompleteness, inconsistencies, or ambiguities. A specification’s 
susceptibility to ONB can be classified as a form of incompleteness because the susceptibility can occur 
due to a lack of contingencies in addressing unintended behaviors. Unintended system behaviors can 
also be cause by ambiguities in a specification.  
Ambiguities  
Ambiguities relates to how the specifications are interpreted by others, particularly further down 
the development cycle. Because requirements are typically initially expressed in a natural language, they 
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are highly susceptible to the ambiguities possible within that language. The presence of ONB 
susceptibility can be viewed as a result of ambiguity, because every contingency for handling an ONB 
was not explicitly stated in the requirements.  For example, imagine a system with water pump that is 
controlled by the state of one or more water valves. Furthermore imagine that the water pump’s behavior 
is specified during a specific situation, without explicitly specifying the state of a related valve switch. 
This could result in unintended interactions between the pump and the valve. The valve switch’s 
behavior, in relation to the pump, would be left up to multiple interpretations and thus ambiguously 
defined. One could also argue that this same scenario would be an example of incompletely defining the 
interaction between the pump and valve. 
 Ambiguities are arguably the most challenging defect to expose, in part, because ambiguities 
are more a product of semantics than syntax. A formal approach is better suited to exposing syntactical 
errors (which are symbolic in nature), but lacks in its ability to expose errors in the meaning (semantics) 
behind the symbols. However, in this research we have defined ambiguity as being the opposite of 
explicitness. In doing so, we equate an ambiguity to an instance of a component-state that has not been 
explicitly defined. In the proposed Causal Component Model of requirements, the model’s numerical 
representation non-explicitly defined component states appear as zeroes. Thus, we have a correlation 
between the presence of zeroes and the existence of ambiguities. By “filling-in” the zeroes we eliminate 
ambiguities. This concept is closely tied to the exposure of off-nominal behavior susceptibility, which 
we will cover in the next section. 
Susceptibility to Off-Nominal Behaviors (ONB) 
In a study conducted by Boehm and company, they concluded that “Many requirements defects 
are due to Off-nominal behavior, unaccounted for in the requirements” [10].  In embedded systems, 
such as the embedded system controller a skid loader, ONBs can posed a safety hazard, if and when an 
operator behaves in an off-nominal manner which had not been anticipated by the stakeholders. Off-
Nominal Behaviors are defined as follows: 
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“Off-nominal behavior is defined as the class of system behaviors  that are outside of the 
boundaries of the intended behavior (based on purpose and objectives), or the expected behavior (based 
on performance of realized system)” [151]. While it may be argued that most if not all ONBs will 
eventually be exposed and addressed prior to product’s release, like all other fault classes, the sooner an 
ONB is exposed, the lesser the time and cost to address. In the literature, ONBs are more often 
addressed from the standpoint of the system’s operating environment. Specifically, the focus is on 
studying ways to prevent human operators from causing an ONB related problem [137, 138]. ONBs can 
occur for various reasons. For example, a system’s human operator is confronted with an unexpected 
scenario, forcing the operator to react in an abnormal way, or the system’s sensor data can unexpectedly 
be outside the range or of a different data type. Furthermore, the assumed preconditions for the system’s 
operation could be different than anticipated or non-existent. These ONB problems are often addressed 
from the environmental standpoint, while focusing on the Human Machine Interface (HMI), because 
human behavior cannot be fully predictable and is prone to unexpected behaviors [147, 155].  
A major industry that has invested considerable efforts to address ONBs is aviation where 
erroneous human behavior can have catastrophic results [137, 160]. In this context, ONBs can also be 
called: Off-Nominal cases, Off-Nominal events, mitigation strategies, Off-Nominal events conditions 
Off-Nominal events operations, Off-Nominal scenarios, Off-Nominal operational requirements, Off-
Nominal recovery, or Off-Nominal situations. The aviation industry has tried to address ONB problems 
during the requirement phase, focusing on anticipating and specifying contingencies (in the form of 
scenarios) that address potential pilot errors [155]. Neerinex has taken a cognitive engineering approach 
to address the problem by trying to anticipate an operator’s actions and responses to off-nominal 
scenarios [153]. Giese and Kruger have suggested an iterative methodology to develop a scenario 
specification from an initial set of nominal scenarios, which are subsequently generalized and used to 
produce additional off-nominal scenarios [146]. Fraccone et al. have used simulation-based models to 
create off-nominal conditions for air-traffic procedures [148]. Scenarios and simulation-based models 
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have also been used to anticipate what contingencies have not specified been and improve the system’s 
robustness, making them more “foolproof” [64].  
Compared to the human operator’s role, relatively little research has been conducted is 
addressing the ONBP from the system’s standpoint (which adds to the value of this research). One 
example is the Systematic Off-NOMinal Requirements Analysis SONOMA, which addresses ONBs at 
the system’s design level. However, ONBs should be addressed during the requirements phase for two 
major reasons 1) There is always a cost and time saving when defects are addressed in the requirements 
phase. 2) In the requirements phase there is access to stakeholders who are domain experts and have a 
clearer grasp of the problem being addressed by the system being specified. These domain experts 
greatly help in determining intended behaviors while exposing unintended behaviors. For example, 
when specifying the user interaction with an ATM machine, a stakeholder familiar with the details of 
bank transactions would in better position to describe how the expected behavior of the ATM’s user. 
Recall that in the proposed CCM approach the goal is to explicitly specify the intended behaviors and 
therefore mitigate all unintended behaviors. This reduces a system’s susceptibility to ONBs. A 
stakeholder familiar with all the intended behaviors is highly valued in this regard. 
When addressing ONBs from a system standpoint, there are various methods that focus on 
systems that have already been implemented (in contrast to our method which focuses on the 
requirement phase). The other methods include Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [157], Event Tree Analysis 
(ETA) [158], Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA) [159], and the use of model checking [91, 161]. 
ETAs require (historical) knowledge of an existing system, whereas we are trying to assess unintended 
behavior from requirement ambiguities. FTAs use a cause-and-effect diagram with digital logic symbols 
to deal with known failures and try to assess the root cause [157]. CCA integrates fault trees and event 
trees to predict the effect of a failure scenario. All these methods require knowledge that pertains to a 
designed or implemented system, as opposed to a system that is being specified and not yet 
implemented. Model checking is well suited for determining if an undesired state can be reached, a 
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reach-ability problem, but in our case, we also want to assess both the cause of an undesired state and 
whether it is non-recoverable. Using our CCM rule-based approach can readily address these questions 
without needing the temporal-logic knowledge required for model checking [150]. 
Finally, there is off-nominal behavior testing which typically occurs at the end of the 
development cycle during software testing, which can involve scenarios designed to expose the 
software’s response to an off-nominal case [155]. Verma et al.’s study utilizes off-nominal behavior test 
cases for airplane runway operations to expose possible ONBs [147]. As with testing in general, off-
nominal behavior testing can have limited effectiveness because exhaustive testing is not practical [154].  
It is not unusual for an embedded system’s user to find a bug after the system’s release into the 
field. When inquiries about the user behaviors are made, it is often discovered that the user found the 
bug by interacting with the system in a way other than the “happy paths” [152]. “Happy paths” refer to 
scenarios under which systems are typically tested and for which risk assessments are made. However, 
software systems tend to have more transition paths than are typically tested, and there are many 
scenarios that are not accounted for, in particular ones that are off-nominal [151]. A common consensus 
is that exhaustive system testing, using every possible test scenario, is unpractical, thus the normal, 
expected, and intended scenarios are used due to the lack of testing time [152, 154]. Of course, we are 
not excluding the use of formal methods which often strive to prove the correctness of a system’s critical 
parts [82] but typically require a considerable learning curve. Our approach can be considered a 
lightweight formal method that is designed for the stakeholders’ ease of use.  
Requirements Modeling of Embedded Systems  
The modeling of requirements has become a very useful endeavor which helps to expose 
ambiguities and enables the automatic validation of requirements. For our discussion, a model is an 
abstract representation of a system, in which a particular aspect of that system is emphasized in the 
representation [87]. That being the case, it is often necessary to model a complex system using more 
than one model; each model would then offer a different view of the system. This enables an analyst of 
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that system to focus on one system view at a time. Models are commonly used in the design phase of a 
systems development, where often the UML, with its multiple modeling views, allows for the complete 
modeling of a system, both from a structural and behavioral perspective. Models can also be used during 
the requirements engineering phase as a more formal alternative (and/or compliment) to natural 
language representation of requirements.  
Modeling a set of requirements helps convey information to other stakeholders in a non-
ambiguous manner. It also allows for the automated analysis of requirements. Requirements can be 
modeled mathematically, descriptively, or graphically. A mathematical representation involves the use 
of a formal and symbolic language that can be manipulated using a set of logic-based rules. Descriptive 
models can include the use of scenarios, which many in industry have found to be very effective in 
capturing desired system behavior from non-technical stakeholders [6, 7]. Graphical representation 
involves the use of diagrams, the most popular in embedded system requirements being variations of a 
finite state machine. This is due to the state transition nature of embedded systems; embedded systems 
don’t typically terminate, but tend to be in one or more concurrent states at any given time.  
Modeling has been accepted as a fundamental activity throughout requirements engineering 
processes [4, 6, 7]. Typically the models are “virtual” in the sense that they exist in the computer, as 
mathematical or logical representations of the requirements. Some of the “virtual” models that have 
been used with embedded systems include Petri Nets [57, 104], Message Sequence Charts [8, 37], and 
the FSM structure associated with model checking [58]. However, these methods tend to limit 
stakeholders’ involvement, due to up-front amount of technical on-boarding, and they are not 
necessarily requirements centric. Also, building models often requires NL translation and this translation 
process can be problematic due to the inherent incompleteness and ambiguities of NL [1, 52, 108]. To 
address this problem, many researchers have proposed various modeling techniques including partial 
automated NL translation approaches [6, 7, 8, 53]. These methods include approaches based on 
translating goals to state machines [6], scenarios to state machines [7], and NL to UML [106].  
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One method involves analyzing NL requirements (in the form of scenarios) with computational 
linguistics and generating Message Sequence Charts (MSC) [8, 38]. The MSC charts are then used for 
verification purposes [A8]. MSCs are interactive diagrams that belong to the Specification and 
Description Language (SDL). They are similar to the sequence diagrams found in UML. They have 
become a popular means of specifying scenarios, which describe interactions between objects in a 
system. They are regarded as useful early in the development stage [38]. An approach by Damas et al. 
[6, 26] addresses a problem on how to automate a modeling process using scenarios collected from end-
users. Their approach captures scenarios using message sequence charts (MSCs) and then  builds a state 
model in the form of a labeled transition system (LST) using MSCs. Similarly, Letier et al. [27] utilize 
MSCs and LST to analyze requirements, but they focus on detecting implied scenarios. Sutcliffe et al. 
[29, 25] present a method that converts use case diagrams into scenarios semi-automatically and 
validates scenarios using rule-based frames that detect incomplete/incorrect event patterns. Another 
target model that has been used is the Object Oriented Analysis Model (OOAM). One approach uses a 
tool that automatically creates OOAMs for NL requirements that have been rewritten in a constraint 
language that facilitates the conversion process [39]. Another approach is to use a conceptual model (an 
ontology) [40].  When modeling the requirements of an embedded system, the emphasis is often on 
modeling the behavior of the system. An embedded system typically has more than one type of 
behavior, each of which should be taken into account when modeling requirements. The following list is 
not meant to be exhaustive, but rather is meant to illustrate some of the behaviors that can be modeled.  
 The cause and effect between the user’s action and the actuators, being controlled by the system.  
 The behavior of the system’s control unit in response to the user’s behavior.  
 The cause and effect between sensors and the actuators, being controlled by the system.  
 The behavior of the system’s control unit in response to a sensor’s behavior.  
 The closed loop behaviors in the system.  
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 The cause and effect between interrupts, service routines, and possibly actuators being 
controlled by the system. 
 Concurrent behaviors of the various system components.  
The CCM was developed to capture the above listed behaviors of an embedded system. The 
CCM explicitly models the following separation of concerns (note that a component can be a sensor, 
controller, or actuator). 
 The behavior of system component X as it affects system component Y. 
 The concurrent behaviors of system components X and Y. 
 The behavior of the system’s operating environment as it affects the system. 
 The reaction of the system to its operating environment. 
Cognitive Approach to Off-Nominal Behavior Problem 
ONBs can occur for various reasons, including the following three situations [155]. A system’s 
human operator is confronted with an unexpected scenario, forcing the operator to react in an abnormal 
way. The system’s sensor data can be unexpectedly outside the range or of a different data type. The 
assumed preconditions for the system’s operation could be different than anticipated or nonexistent.  
The ONB problem is often addressed from the environmental standpoint, while focusing on the Human 
Machine Interface (HMI), because human behavior cannot be fully predictable and is prone to 
unexpected behaviors [147]. A major industry that has invested considerable efforts to address ONBs is 
aviation where erroneous human behavior can have catastrophic results [160, 137]. NASA has also 
recognized the importance of performing off-nominal testing as a means to assure that its software can 
deal with unpredictable contingencies [154]. The aviation industry has tried to address ONB problems 
within the requirement phase, focusing on anticipating and specifying contingencies (in the form of 
scenarios) that address potential pilot errors [149]. Some researchers have taken a cognitive engineering 
approach.  
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These approaches address the problem from the system operator’s perspective by trying to 
anticipate the operator’s actions and responses to off-nominal scenarios [153]. Others have suggested an 
iterative methodology to develop a scenario specification from an initial set of nominal scenarios. These 
scenarios are subsequently generalized and used to produce additional off-nominal scenarios [146]. 
Generalization and refinement are performed by subjecting a given scenario to a set of issues in the form 
of question/action pairs [146]. Some have used simulation-based models to create off-nominal 
conditions in air traffic procedures [148]. The use of scenarios and simulation-based models, emphasize 
the need to try to anticipate what can go wrong in the field, and assure that the system can handle such 
occurrences. 
Off-Nominal Testing 
Many efforts have been made in the area of off-nominal testing which typically occurs at the 
end of the development cycle during software testing [133]. These tests can involve scenarios designed 
to expose the software’s response to an off-nominal case [155]. Some claim that Off-nominal testing can 
improve  the understanding of how humans interact with machines, or may expose design issues. [133]. 
As with testing in general, off-nominal testing can have limitations for its effectiveness because 
exhaustive testing is not practical [154]. It is not unusual for an embedded system’s user to find a system 
bug after the system’s release into the field.  
When inquiries about the user behaviors are made, it is often discovered that the user found the 
bug by interacting with the system in a way other than the “happy paths” [152]. “Happy paths” refer to 
scenarios under which systems are typically tested and for which risk assessments are made. However, 
software systems tend to have a lot more transition paths than are typically tested, and there are many 
scenarios that are not accounted for, in particular those that are off-nominal [151]. A common consensus 
is that exhaustive testing of a system, using every possible test scenario, is undoable, thus the normal, 
expected, and intended scenarios are used due to the lack of time [152, 154].  
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The System Modeling Language (SysML) 
The Systems Modeling Language (SysML) is used to model systems engineering applications 
[151] . The semantics of SysML are similar to, but more expressive than UML, allowing for the 
specification, analysis, design, verification and validation of a broad range of systems. This makes it 
useful in requirements engineering. While SysML is typically used to model intended behavior, some 
researchers have developed a means of modeling off-nominal behaviors by them as the “inverse of 
intent”, and deriving this from the activity models. But this approach requires the use of more than one 
model, such as Parametric Diagrams, Internal Block Diagrams, Activity Diagrams, Block Definition 
Diagrams, and State Effects Diagrams. Some of the models are variations of the standard UML models, 
and require further learning on the user’s part. 
Formal Specification Languages  
Compared to manual inspection, a formal verification of requirements provides a more non-
subjective concept of correctness, and can be automated by a support tool. Formal verification also 
avoids the pitfalls of strict human intervention such as the tendency to skim and make erroneous 
assumptions. Formal methods often strive to prove the correctness of a system’s critical parts [82] but 
typically require a large learning curve. Our approach can be considered a light-weight formal method 
that is designed for the stakeholders’ ease of use.  Compared to manual inspection, a formal approach to 
the verification/validation of requirements provides a more non-subjective concept of correctness, and 
can be automated by a support tool. A formal approach also avoids the pitfalls of manual human 
inspection such as the tendency to skim and make erroneous assumptions. However, to apply a formal 
approach to set of requirements involves formalizing Natural Language, which a very informal means of 
knowledge representation. Thus, a major question in the selection of a formal representation for use with 
requirements is “How easily can a set of NL requirements be formalized.”  
The next question concerns the means in which the formalized requirements can be checked for 
correctness, defined as completeness, consistency, lack of ambiguities, and the contingency for all off-
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nominal behaviors.  The following seven formal specification languages are commonly used for real-
time embedded systems: Z, Object Z, VDM++, LUSTRE, ASTRAL, CSP, RAISE, and Petri-Net. Table 
1 shows a comparison of these seven formal languages. CCM has been added to the last row, for 
comparative purposes. Even though CCM has not been referred to as formal specification language, it 
does formalize a set of requirements, and has characteristics of the other languages as expressed by the 
parameters listed in Table 1. These parameters are: 
Type – The type of representation used in the language. State-based means that the system is 
represented as a state-machine, Object-based means the system is represented as a set of classes. Data-
flow refers to the system being represented as data handler. Finally, a process algebra is a mathematical 
representation.   
 Sync/Async? – The type of system the language can model, whether synchronous (clock based 
transitions that occur periodically, in a predictable manner), or Asynchronous, (transitions that 
occur a-periodically; somewhat unpredictable). 
 Concurrency? – Asks whether the language can model concurrent processes. 
 Executable? – Asks whether the language can be used as a prototype, in that the system 
behavior can be simulated. 
 Time Model – Describes whether the language models a system in discrete time (variables 
transition from one discrete state to another) or continuous time (variables can assume an 
infinite number of values between two given system states). 
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Table 1.  The various formal methods used with embedded systems 
Language Type 
Sync/ 
Async? 
Concurrency? Executable? 
Time 
Model 
Z State-based Sync NO NO Discrete 
Object Z Object-based Sync YES NO Discrete 
VDM++ Object-based Sync YES YES Discrete 
LUSTRE Dataflow Sync YES YES Discrete 
ASTRAL State-based Async YES YES Discrete 
CSP Process Algebra Sync YES NO Discrete 
RAISE 
Semi Object-
based 
Async YES NO Discrete 
Petri-Net State-based Sync YES YES Discrete 
CCM 
Rule-Based 
State-Based 
Sync 
(Async 
possible) 
YES YES Discrete 
 
It is reasonable to assume that the parameters of Table 1 are considered important when 
formally modeling embedded systems. Note that they somewhat complement the embedded system 
characteristics mentioned at the bottom of section 2.3.  To facilitate stakeholder interaction, CCM was 
conceived with ability to prototype a set of requirements. Recall from section 2.1 that one of the 
concepts that led to CCM was Virtual Requirements Prototype, which sought a way to validation 
requirements the same way hardware can be validated by allowing stakeholder interaction via a 
prototype. Thus, the ability to simulate behaviors is an important feature to have. Since Z, Object Z, 
CSP, and RAISE are not executable, we will dismiss them as viable competitors to CCM. Instead, we 
will compare CCM to ASTRAL, VDM++, LUSTRE, and Petri-Net, in greater detail.  
ASTRAL defines a system as a set of state machine specifications using a modular abstraction 
hierarchy approach. This makes it suitable for large systems.  
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By contrast CCM’s scalability comes from the ability to represent a system at different levels of 
abstractions. Astral has a module construct good for large systems and deals with one transition at a 
time. CCM focuses on “What” the system is supposed to do; captures minimal details” 
VDM++ , The Vienna Development Method (VDM),  is one of the longest-established formal 
method for the development of computer-based systems. Computing systems may be modeled in VDM-
SL at a higher level of abstraction than is achievable using programming languages, allowing the 
analysis of designs and identification of key features, including defects, at an early stage of system 
development. Models that have been validated can be transformed into detailed system designs through 
a refinement process. The language has a formal semantics, enabling proof of the properties of models to 
a high level of assurance. It also has an executable subset, so that models may be analyzed by testing 
and can be executed through graphical user interfaces, so that models can be evaluated by experts who 
are not necessarily familiar with the modeling language itself.  
LUSTRE is a declarative language that can be used to specify software used in synchronous 
real-time applications. Being declarative, Lustre does not supports loops, nor recursive calls; it specifies 
what to do, rather than how to do it, which makes it suitable for use in requirements. A Lustre program 
is written using nodes and variables, where the variables change value as a function of time. It’s 
syntactical structure is less intuitive that the rule-based structure of CCM. Using Lustre amounts to 
learning a programming language, which limits its usage to personnel trained in the language, contrary 
to the goal of encouraging participation of all stakeholders.  
A Petri-Net (also known as a place/transition net or P/T net) is one of several mathematical 
modeling languages for the description of distributed systems. A Petri net is a directed bipartite graph, in 
which the nodes represent transitions (i.e. events that may occur, signified by bars) and places (i.e. 
conditions, signified by circles). The directed arcs describe which places are pre- and/or post conditions 
for which transitions (signified by arrows). Some sources state that Petri nets were by Carl Adam Petri 
for the purpose of describing chemical processes. 
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Model Checking 
One of the approaches described in this research is model checking, which is a form of property 
checking. The model checking process is defined as follows. Let M be the FSM representing a 
concurrent finite-state system, and F be a temporal logic formula that expresses a desired property 
(specification) that M must satisfy. The model checking problem is to determine all the system state 
traversals that satisfy F. For example, a temporal specification may specify that a given system state 
must eventually be reached. The model checking algorithm traverses every path in the FSM and 
determines whether that system state is eventually reached, satisfying the temporal property. If a 
property is satisfied, the model checker returns true, if not satisfied, the model checker provides a 
counter example (a path that shows why the property was not satisfied). Model checking has 
successfully been used to find previously undetected errors in hardware implementations, such as the 
IEEE Futurebus+ cache coherence protocol [128] and the IEEE scalable coherent interface [141].  
It has also been used in protocol verification. One of the primary problems associated with 
model checking is the state explosion problem, in which the number of possible system states grows 
exponentially with each addition system element and the number of states it can produce [91]. 
Subsequently, there are various forms of model checking, each trying to manage the problem of state 
explosion, such as partial order reduction [144], bounded model checking [121], and symbolic model 
checking [127]. Among these approaches, symbolic model checking that uses a symbolic model verifier 
(SMV) has been a de facto model checking approach [127]. A SMV represents the FSM structure 
implicitly using a propositional logic formulas, and has been able to model thousands of states [91], 
without having to construct a FSM, with potentially thousands of states, explicitly. A SMV will also 
reduce the number of states in the model, using a binary decision diagram. 
Another model checking related tool that compares somewhat with CCM is UPPAAL [167], 
which is used for the simulation and verification of real-time systems. UPPAAL is an integrated tool 
designed to answer reach-ability questions and consists of a description language, a simulator, and a 
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model checker.  A system in UPPAAL is composed of concurrent processes, each of them modeled as 
an automaton. The synchronization mechanism in UPPAAL is a hand-shaking synchronization: two 
processes take a transition at the same time.  
With CCM the transitions into the next system state is dependent on the system’s present state. 
Another difference between UPPAAL and CCM is that, while UPPAAL models separate processes, 
CCM models separate component behaviors. With UPPAAL the separate processes are transitioned by 
common events; with CCM the separate component behaviors are transitions by other component states. 
The notation used with UPPAAL is C language-based and has a steeper learning curve than the rules-
based notation used with CCM. Of particular usefulness in addressing ONB problems is that CCM can 
distinguish between E and T transitions more easily than UPAAL. 
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2: SQ Query
Goal: Verification of requirements by 
having a stakeholder ask a Scenario 
Question designed to expose defects.
  Results: The approach assumed the 
preexistence of requirements expressed 
as an STD.
Work published [64]
3: NLtoSTD
Goal: Develop a systematic means of 
translating requirements into an STD.
Results: Three, multiple-subject 
experiments of NLtoSTD, encouraging, 
but showed much room for improvement; 
this would ultimately lead to CCM.
Work published [38, 75, 76, 166] 
4: Virtual Requirements Prototyping
Goal: Develop a means to verify a set of reactive 
requirements, based on NLtoSTD.
Results: VRP research verified NLtoSTD 
better suited for embedded requirements 
and property checking.
Work published [74]
5: Requirements Property Checking
(w\CCM and Model Checker)
Goal: Use CCM as a cognitive friendly front 
end to a NuSMV model checker to expose 
defects related to Off-Nominal Behaviors.
Results: Model checker answered 
the question of reachability. A means 
of answering a broader range of 
questions would be more useful when 
addressing Off-Nominal Behaviors.
Work published [161]
6: CCM State Profiling Approach
Goal: Use CCM to both model a set 
of embedded requirements and expose 
the requirements susceptibility to 
Off-Nominal behaviors produced 
by the operating environment.
Results: The expansion of CCM 
rules and subsequent state profiling 
of those rules to expose ONBs
Work submitted/reviewed
[Motivated development of NLtoSTD] 
[Inspired 
Creation of] 
[CCM] 
[Property Checking] 
[Further Improvement
to focus on ONB problem] 
1: Requirements Verification
Goal: Research the various problems in the area of embedded requirements.
Results: Surmised various insights on how to expose various requirements problems (introduced to Off-Nominal Behavior). 
Work published as survey paper [165]
 
Figure 1. Research progression behind the dissertation 
 
RESEARCH GROUNDWORK 
Overview of Preliminary Research 
While it cannot be claimed that all the research in this dissertation was completely pre-planned 
from beginning to end (rarely does research occur in such a manner), it can be said that every idea that 
was explored contributed to the dissertation’s final form. Figure 1 shows the dissertation’s progression 
from the broad concept of requirement verification, to the specific act of addressing off-nominal 
Behaviors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each block briefly describes a goal, and at least one result of pursuing that goal. The work 
described in block was subsequently published. The pursuit of each goal resulted in lessons learned, 
which in turn often became the motivation for another goal. The logical progression from one goal to the 
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next, is illustrated by the arrows between the blocks of Figure 1. Together, all the blocks show the work 
flow that culminated in the latest version of the CCM. The workflow both tells the story of how the 
research progressed from concept to concept, with some publications resulting along the way.  
As expressed in a previous section, the initial motivation began with the verification of 
requirements, which started with the concept of SQ Querying (block 2, Figure 1); the idea of posing a 
question to a set of requirements. In other words, what if any stakeholder could query a set of 
requirements in an effort to verify whether or not the behaviors expressed in those requirements were the 
behaviors they had intended? Such questions could represent scenarios, such as “Will the elevator cab 
ever move with the doors open?”, or “Will the motor ever keep running beyond an overheated state?”   
The mere act of asking a question would be doable by anyone, with little or no prior training in formal 
requirements verification.  
While the conception of SQ Query (block 2) addressed the key elements that would be needed 
to achieve its goal, it operated on the assumption that a set of requirements could be readily converted 
into a State Transition Diagram (STD). The irony was that while asking a question was a simple task, 
producing the STD upon which the question is asked would not be as simple, often requiring an ad-hoc 
approach. This motivated the development of a systematic means of translating a set of requirements 
into an STD; an approach that was named NLtoSTD (Natural Language to State Transition Diagram) 
(block 3). One of the principle goals in NLtoSTD was to maintain a one-to-one relationship between 
each requirement and a segment of the resulting STD. This could afford NLtoSTD the ability to expose 
defects through the mere act of translating the requirements from an informal natural language to a 
formalized version that would expose incompleteness and ambiguities. Gaps in the translated STD 
would directly map to defects in the set requirements; facilitating the exposing and correction of those 
defects. NLtoSTD also inspired the concept of VRP (Virtual Requirement Prototyping) (block 4), which 
sought to expose defects by virtually prototyping a set of requirements in a similar way that problems 
are exposed by physically prototyping hardware. NLtoSTD eventually became a research focus in itself 
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as it was further modified through a series of three multiple subject experiments (block 3). However, the 
lessons learned from the experiments, prompted the sacrifice of NLtoSTD’s one-to-one relationship, to 
achieve a more consistent means of translation. The result was the development of CCM (Causal 
Component Model) (block 5). CCM allows the creation of a requirements model that captured not just 
concurrency (a common characteristic of embedded systems), but also the operating system’s interaction 
with that system. From the research conducted with VRP came the idea of using property checking 
because it equated with “asking a question” of not only the system’s behavior, but part of its structure as 
well, as in the case of a property design to expose incompleteness. CCM was, thus, combined with 
property checking by using a model checker as a backend to CCM (block 5). However, model checking 
is best suited for asking questions that are framed in the form of reach-ability, such as “Can an undesired 
system state be reached eventually.” This is because model checking employees path traversal when 
analyzing a state transition system.   
Ultimately, a wider range of questions could be asked if a rules-based approach was used 
directly on the CCM. This would help answer questions of susceptibility to off nominal behavior, 
whether an undesired state can be recovered, and other questions that apply more to structure than just 
behavior. This motivated focusing on the CCM notation, which is inherently rule-based.  Upon viewing 
our approach as being rule-based, further observations were made. 
1) A rule based system can be easily treated as an expert system, which would also allow a more 
effective implementation of the SQ Query concept.  
2) A rule based system can be enacted (via forward chaining) in order to simulate the system’s 
behaviors, which would also allow for the implementation of the VRP concept. 
3) Rules could be possibly categorized according to certain  properties, which would also allow for 
the implementation of the property checking concept. 
Thus, a rule-based approach could potentially achieve the goals expressed in Blocks 2, 4, and 5. 
However there were further observations made about a rule-based system that eventually resulted in 
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what we will refer to as the CCM State Profiling Approach (Block 6, of Figure 1).  These further 
observations include: 
1) The rules that define the CCM were ambiguous, leading to the thought that the ambiguities in the 
rules, correlated to ambiguities in the initial NL requirements.  
2) Rules can be selectively removed, which in turn, removes selected behaviors. 
3) Each rule can be automatic translated back into a structure NL requirement. 
Further research developed a means of converting the ambiguous CCM rules into more 
explicated rules that could, in turn, be used to produce a Label Transition System (LTS) with global 
states, similar to the Kripke structure associated with model checking. Eventually, it was found that the 
set of explicit rules describes all the behaviors possible by the CCM rules including those behaviors that 
were unintended due the ambiguities in the CCM rules. Block 6, shows the culmination of the research 
and publications produced in this dissertation. In this final approach, the CCM rules are expanded so as 
to address every state in the system’s state space. The result is a rule for every possible intended and 
unintended behavior. The rules are examined using a state profiling concept  to determine which rules, if 
any, terminate in a non-recoverable undesired state.     
In summary, the ONB problem could have been addressed by SQ querying using scenario 
questions that describe off-nominal scenarios. Off course, this means that stakeholders would need to 
anticipate all the possible off-nominal scenarios in advance. As the system grows in complexity, 
anticipating all possible ONB scenarios because virtually un-achievable. It is more manageable to access 
the various undesired system states that stakeholders wish to avoid and determine if these states are 
reachable by actions caused by the operator environment. This was demonstrated as achievable by using 
a model checker as a backend to CCM. The concept was extended further by expanding the CCM rules 
into all possible interpretations of the requirements and removing those interpretations that can 
potentially result in an ONB. In this manner, we address the problem from a susceptibility standpoint. 
We now examine SQ Querying, NLtoSTD, and Virtual Requirements Prototyping (VRP) in greater detail. 
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SQ Querying 
With SQ Querying (a.k.a. SQ
2
E) the goal was to develop a validation technique that analyzes a 
requirements model by asking a question about the model's behavior. During the SQ querying process, a 
Scenario Question (SQ) is first expressed in plain English, and then translated (by the user) into a set of 
inference constraints, which the tool uses to query a model. The tool then answers a question by 
generating and displaying state transition traversal path strings (in short, path strings), which represent 
paths through a model describing its behavior. To investigate the feasibility of this approach, we 
implemented a tool for SQ
2
E that was written in Prolog and C#. The tool required both the inference 
constraints and the requirements being queried expressed as a State Transition Diagrams (STD).  
We applied the tool to simple case study, and observed that SQ querying could not only catch a 
model error, but also prompt questions that lead to a model's improvement. The key to a SQ query's 
strength lies in involving users, and allowing them to verbally express a scenario question. The STD 
traversal paths strings, which are final results, are visually verified by the user, providing more 
information than what is normally obtained from a simple binary pass/fail result. The involvement of the 
human in the SQ querying process adds a human interpretation element; examining the various path 
strings for a given query can often bring to mind other questions, which ultimately leads to a more in-
depth analysis.  
Through our case study, we observed that our approach can be also applied to software testing 
process in addition to requirements validation; our SQ querying approach can also facilitate exploratory 
testing, which is an ad-hoc approach to testing software in which human testers test software systems in 
an exploratory manner [17].  
In exploratory testing, test cases are not defined in advance; they are formulated and executed 
while testers walk through the product. One of the benefits of exploratory testing is that it provides a 
learning experience for the person doing the testing. Exploratory testing provides testers the flexibility to 
explore the software's behavior, and relies on feedback from the software system as human testers assess 
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Figure 2. The initial conception that eventually led to CCM 
the effects of their actions on the software under test. The ability to query a model and receive feedback 
in the form of path strings provides a similar form of interactions that is one of key characteristics of 
exploratory testing. Thus, it was thought that SQ querying would appeal to those who gravitate toward 
exploratory testing. The main drawback with SQ2E was the presumed existence of requirements 
expressed as an STD. This inspired the need for CCM. 
Experimental Origin of CCM  
CCM was developed through a progression of three separate experiments that were performed at 
NDSU. The experiments were designed to evaluate a proposed approach for exposing defects in a set of 
requirements. The approach involved creating a requirements model in such a way that NL defects, such 
as incompleteness, inconsistencies, and ambiguities, would carry into the model. The model would then 
expose visually or by automatic analysis of the requirements defects.  
The rationale was that it would be much easier to expose defects in a requirements model than 
in the Natural language itself. This would be particularly true if the model has a direct one-to-one 
correspondence with the requirements, so that a defect exposed in one section of the model would 
immediately point to the requirement containing that defect. The idea came from visualizing the 
scenario illustrated in Figure 2. 
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The extreme left hand side of Figure 2 shows a State Transition Diagram (STD) consisting of 
four states (S1, S2, S3, and S4), and five transitions (T1, T2, T3, T4, and T5). Let us imagine that the 
STD models a specified system in exactly the way intended by the stakeholders. In other ways, all the 
desired behaviors are captured by the STD, and no unintended behaviors can occur; the STD is free of 
defects. Let us decompose the STD into the five segments shown in the center of Figure 2 (henceforth, 
these segments will be referred to as STD-Building Blocks (STD-BB)). It stands to reason that if the 
STD is defect free, then so are the building blocks. Let us finally translate the building block verbatim 
into the set of requirements shown on the right hand side of Figure 3. Again it stands to reason that if the 
building blocks are defect free, and they have been literally translated, then the resulting requirements 
are defect free as well.   
The confidence that a correct STD results in a correct set of requirements is based on there 
being a direct one-to-one mapping between STD, its building blocks, and the requirements. This concept 
also applies in the opposite direction when there is a one-to-one mapping starting from requirements to a 
STD. Thus, the goal of NLtoSTD was to translate natural language requirements into an STD, while 
maintaining a one-to-one mapping; any defects in the requirements would map into the STD where the 
defects can be more readily exposed, and corrected. Once a correct STD is obtaining, it is converted 
back into a corrected set of requirements, using the same one-to-one mapping. The NLtoSTD method 
consists of the two steps shown in Figure 3. 
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Req1: While in the S1 state, event T1 shall result 
in the system transitioning to state S2
Req2: While in the S2 state, the system shall go 
to state S4, when event T2 occurs.
Req3: While in the S4 state, event T5 shall cause 
the system to go to state S3.
Req4: When the system reaches state S3, the T4 
event shall cause the system to go to state S1.
Req5: When the system is in state S3, it shall go 
to state S2, as a result of event T3 occurring.
S1 S2
T1
S2 S4
T2
T5
S3S4
T4
S1S3
T3
S2S3
S1
S2S3
S4
T1
T2
T3
T4
T5
Step 1: NL to STD-BB Translation
Step 2: STD-BB to STD Contruction
 
Figure 3. The two steps involved in NLtoSTD translation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1 (the left side box with dotted line) involves the translation of NL requirements into STD-
BBs while Step 2 (the right side box with dotted line) involves the construction of an STD using the 
STD-BBs. The objective in Step 1 is to convert each requirement into a STD-BB. The user is to examine 
each individual requirement and determines the three elements: (1) a current state (Sc), (2) a next state 
(Sn), and (3) a transition (T), that make up each STD-BB. If we assumption that each functional 
requirement describes a behavior that results in something changing state, then ideally each requirement 
should express a precondition in the form of a current state (Sc) and a post condition in the form of a 
next state (Sn). The cause of that transition (T) should also be indicated.  
However, typical NL requirements do not explicitly state current and next states, thus a 
requirement’s preconditions and post conditions are often inferred and not explicitly stated. In the 
ideally stated requirement, preconditions and post conditions should be explicitly expressed to minimize 
ambiguities and incompleteness. Similarly, the absence of the explicit transition (T) information can 
cause different interpretations for the same requirement by different stakeholders or inspectors. 
The NLtoSTD-BB method would force the inspectors to look for these three elements in a NL 
requirement, thereby ensuring that the requirements are as concise and clear as possible. Figure 5 
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Figure 4. Example of how NLtoSTD would be used 
illustrates the process of converting a set of five requirements into seven STD-BBs. Note that while 
there are five requirements and seven STD-BBs, there is still a traceable mapping between each STD-
BB and one of the five requirements. The red “???” in the STD-BBs indicate states and transitions that 
were not explicitly stated. This in turn results in an incomplete STD at the right-hand side of Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of ambiguities, the user is encouraged to enter their interpretation of states and 
transitions. Since the resulting STD can be analyzed for intended behaviors, an ambiguous interpretation 
will be exposed eventually. Inconsistencies can also be exposed through automatic analysis of the STD. 
The STD’s behavior could be simulated by a support tool in order to expose faults that may not be 
evident unless the STD is enacted. Eventually, a series of the three experiments were conducted in order 
to determine three primary factors. 1) how effective would NLtoSTD be at exposing faults. 2) how 
efficient would NLtoSTD be at exposing faults. 3) How cognitive friendly would NLtoSTD be to utilize. 
The results of each experiment is summarized in the next three sections. 
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The Three NLtoSTD Experiments 
The CCM was developed as the result of three experiments conducted to evaluate the feasibility 
and effectiveness of NLtoSTD. In the first two experiments a control was used in the form of a fault-
check inspection list, the third experiment used only the NLtoSTD approach. There were three research 
questions (RQn) investigated during each of the three experiments. 
RQ1: Is NLtoSTD-BB more effective (i.e., the number of faults) at detecting incomplete and 
ambiguous requirements compared to the fault-checklist based method during inspection of an 
NL requirement document? 
RQ2: Is NLtoSTD-BB more efficient (i.e., faults per hour) at detecting incomplete and 
ambiguous requirements compared to the fault-checklist based method during inspection of an 
NL requirement document? 
RQ3: Is NLtoSTD-BB viewed to be useful for improving the software quality? 
As we progressed through each experiment, modifications were made to NLtoSTD. By the end 
of the third experiment, NLtoSTD was modified to a degree to where it became CCM. Each of the three 
experiments, along with the results was subsequently published, in great detail. In this dissertation we 
will summary the experiments beginning with experiment one. For clarity we will align each experiment 
with a version of NLtoSTD, labeled NLtoSTD V1.0, NLtoSTD V2.0, and NLtoSTD V3.0.  
Experimental Design of Experiment One 
The first experiment focused on the creation of NLtoSTD building blocks from a set of 
requirements. The goal of the first experiment, a repeated measures quasi-experiment, was to understand 
whether the original version (V1.0) of NLtoSTD-BB can be effectively used to detect faults in NL 
requirement documents [75]. To accomplish that goal, we compared the NLtoSTD-BB V1.0 against the 
traditional fault-checklist based method in the context of their ability find faults in the software 
requirement documents developed by student teams.  
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Figure 5. Design of NLtoSTD experiment one 
 
The experiment’s design is shown in Figure 5. The participating subjects included sixteen (16) 
students enrolled in the Requirement Definition and Analysis course at North Dakota State University in 
Fall 2010. During the semester, the students worked in teams (of three or four subjects) to elicit and 
document the requirements for a different software system (that was selected by the students and agreed 
upon by the instructor).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A total of five different requirement documents (referred as Document A through E) were 
developed by student teams and the details about them can be found in [75], along with the size (in 
terms of the number of pages) of the requirement documents. After the requirements development, each 
subject individually inspected two different requirement documents (developed by other student teams) 
using two different inspection methods: the first inspection using the fault-checklist method followed by 
the second inspection (of a different document) using the NLtoSTD-BB method.  
When using the NLtoSTD method, the subjects were asked to focus on two fault types Missing 
Functionalities (MF) (i.e. incompleteness) and Ambiguous Information (AI). Missing Functionalities 
equate to incompleteness, for example, if a Present state was not mentioned at all, the subjects were to 
enter a “???”. Ambiguous information was information that was implied but not explicitly stated, for 
 36 
example, if the requirement’s wording implied a present state of “ON” then the subject was to also enter 
“???” (a better distinction between MF and AI was made in the second experiment.) 
Results from Experiment One 
Research Question 1, the effectiveness of NLtoSTD:  NLtoSTD was slightly more effective 
compared to the fault-checklist method, when used by subjects who clearly understood the application 
of the NLtoSTD-BB method.  
Research Question 2, Is NLtoSTD-BB more efficient (i.e., faults per hour): The result from the 
first experiment showed that the fault checklist was more efficient at finding faults. This was mainly 
because of the two reasons: (1) the subjects using the fault checklist looked for ten types of faults, 
whereas the subjects using the NLtoSTD-BB method focused on detecting two fault types (MF and AI); 
and (2) four (of eleven) subjects using the NLtoSTD method found no true faults due to their 
misunderstanding of the translation process. However, the results from the first experiment provided us 
insight to improve the translation process.  
Research Question 3, Is NLtoSTD-BB viewed to be useful for improving the software quality?: 
The subjects’ responses to the post-study survey show that, in general, the NLtoSTD-BB method is 
viewed favorably for most attributes. For the first experiment, some subjects reported problems that they 
faced while choosing the values for Sc, T, and Sn when translating NL into STD-BBs. Based on the 
students’ responses and feedback, we revised the NLtoSTD method to make it easier to understand and 
apply to NL requirements. 
The first experiment showed that the method was substantially better at exposing 
incompletenesses than ambiguities. The first experiment demonstrated that it was feasible to expose 
faults using an approach where a set of NL requirements is formalized into a state transition diagram 
building blocks. These results supported our belief that the nature of the NLtoSTD-BB translation 
process exposes the human tendency to not explicitly state the precondition (current state) associated 
with a given requirement.  
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Figure 6. Design of NLtoSTD experiment two 
Experimental Design of Experiment Two 
Using the revised NLtoSTD-BB method (referred to hereafter as NLtoSTD-BB V2.0), we 
conducted the second experiment by replicating the first experiment with a different experimental design 
[76]. This study utilized a repeated-measure design (with a complete counterbalancing of the treatment 
order) in which the subjects inspected the same NL requirement document (developed externally) using 
both the NLtoSTD-BB V2.0 and the fault-checklist methods. The experiment occurred over a two-week 
period, and the subjects were divided into two groups. During week one, a group of subjects inspected 
the document using the fault-checklist method while the other group of subjects inspected the same 
document using NLtoSTD-BB V2.0. As shown in Figure 6, sixteen participating subjects were 
“randomly” divided into two groups of eight subjects each (Groups A and B). Also, each subject 
performed two inspections of the same requirement document (LAFS) using different inspection 
methods (fault checklist and NLtoSTD-BB V2.0). Finally, subjects within Group A and Group B 
differed in their treatment order for inspection methods during the first and the second inspection cycles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the second week, each subject inspected the same requirement document using the other 
inspection technique and reported new faults that were not detected during the first inspection. 
Therefore, these two inspections resulted in a list of faults for each subject using NLtoSTD-BB V2.0 
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and a fault checklist during the first and second inspection cycles. Sixteen Computer Science graduate 
students enrolled in the Software Design course at North Dakota State University during Spring 2011 
participated in this experiment. These individuals were predominantly master’s and Ph.D. students and 
had taken a requirement engineering course prior to this study.  
The Software Design course focused on analyzing design decisions and implementing software 
designs. During this two-week experiment, the participants inspected a generic NL requirement 
document describing the requirements for the Loan Arranger Financial System (LAFS) that was created 
by professional developers at the Microsoft organization. The Loan Arranger system is responsible for 
bundling loans for sale based on user-specified characteristics. For use in previous studies [35], 
researchers seeded the artifact with realistic defects. 
Results from Experiment Two 
Research Question 1, the effectiveness of NLtoSTD: The results of the second experiment 
showed further improvement over the results from the first experiment. The results showed more 
consistent (across all subjects) improvement for effectiveness when using the NLtoSTD-BB V2.0 
method. In particular, NLtoSTD-BB V2.0 was significantly more effective for AI fault type at p = 0.1 
level than a traditional fault-checklist based inspection method. 
Research Question 2: Is NLtoSTD-BB more efficient (i.e., faults per hour): The results showed 
that the NLtoSTD-BB V2.0 method was more efficient than the fault-checklist method during the first 
and the second inspections. During the first inspection, subjects using NLtoSTD-BB V2.0 found an 
average of 19 faults per hour compared to subjects using the fault-checklist method who found an 
average of 16 faults per hour. However, the difference in the efficiency values was not statistically 
significant (p = 0.49). During the second inspection, NLtoSTD-BB V2.0 (an average of 10 faults per 
hour) was slightly more efficient than the fault-checklist method (an average of 9 faults per hour). 
Therefore, even though the results were not statistically significant, NLtoSTD-BB V2.0 improved the 
efficiency of the participating subjects compared to the fault checklist for both inspection cycles. 
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Although the results from the second experiment was promising, they furthered the need to improve 
NLtoSTD-BB V2.0 in those areas that we felt were hindering the ability to use the method, as it was 
revealed from the third research question (RQ3). 
Research Question 3, Is NLtoSTD-BB viewed to be useful for improving the software quality?: 
The questionnaire, which addressed RQ3, showed that, while the method used in the second experiment 
was easier to apply, there was still room for improvement. The subjects rated the NLtoSTD-BB V2.0 
significantly positive on all the attributes in comparison the NLtoSTD-BB V1.0. So, the revisions were 
justified by the improvement in the responses of NLtoSTD-BB V2.0. The inspectors often reported false 
faults that included information they had assumed was either missing (MF) or not clearly defined (AI) in 
the functional requirements, but was sometimes found in the preceding sections, such as the glossary or 
purpose. False positives associated with NLtoSTD-BB V2.0 were mainly attributed to a lack of fully 
understanding how to apply the method, difficulty deciding which entity to use (especially in the case of 
a lengthy, non-cohesive requirement), or mistaking an operator for state. However, none of the false 
positives with NLtoSTD-BB V2.0 were due to the incorrect assumptions or being unable to properly 
comprehend the complete requirement list. 
The second experiment showed that the improvement made to the method enabled it to find a 
greater amount of ambiguities relative to incompleteness. This was an encouragement because the 
second experiment suggested that the method’s improvement resulted in the approach that can more 
equally expose incompleteness and ambiguities. Also, the results from the second experiment showed 
that NLtoSTD-BB helped locate precondition related problems that were otherwise undetected during 
the fault-checklist based inspection process. Although the results from the second experiment was 
promising, they furthered the need to improve NLtoSTD-BB V2.0 in those areas that we felt were 
hindering the ability to use the method, as it was revealed from the third research question (RQ3). 
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Experimental Design of Experiment Three 
Experiment three was divided into two phases [162]. The first phase involved translated the 
requirements into NLtoSTD-BBs. The second phase involved creating a STD using the NLtoSTD-BBs 
derived in phase one, and analyzing the STD. A support tool was used to build the STD from building 
blocks. The student participants, were divided into 5 different teams of three or four participants. The 
students in each team individually inspected their own SRS document using the NLtoSTD method. The 
participants were first trained on how to map the NL requirements to STD-BBs, while documenting the 
building block elements in an Excel spreadsheet using an in-class example.  The subjects were 
instructed how to load the BBs (from the spreadsheet) into the tool and then, how to construct an STD 
from the BBs. The subjects were then instructed to examine the constructed STD. Finally, the 
participants learned to record the fault type in the fault spreadsheet. To ensure that subjects understood, 
the subjects practiced these steps through an example system. 
Results from Experiment Three Results 
Research Question 1, the effectiveness of NLtoSTD: Based on the results, additional MF and AI 
fault types are uncovered during the examination of STD constructed from the BBs. In particular, the 
creation of STD aids inspectors at detecting incompleteness defects that are otherwise not apparent when 
looking at individual requirements. The construction of STD is useful for overall inspection 
effectiveness using the complete NLtoSTD method. 
Research Question 2: Is NLtoSTD-BB more efficient (i.e., faults per hour): The NLtoSTD-BB 
method helped inspectors find inherent ambiguities and incompleteness in requirements. The 
comparison of the results against the previous research results [5] revealed that the subjects were able to 
find larger number of total faults (on average), and the distribution of faults across fault types (MF and 
AI) was more consistent. The results also showed that the NLtoSTD-BB method helped find the faults 
faster (i.e., efficiency) when compared to the results in [5]. 
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Research Question 3: Is NLtoSTD-BB viewed to be useful for improving the software quality?: 
The subjects provided insights in to the use of the NLtoSTD method and improvements that can help 
improve the performance in future studies. The subjects mentioned that the tool should guide the 
NLtoSTD-BBs translation and should at least highlight parts of STD that are completely disconnected.  
The results are organized around the comparison between the NLtoSTD-BB method and the 
traditional fault-checklist method in detecting requirement faults. The results showed that the subjects 
who were able to correctly extract the STD-BBs were able to find larger number of “incompleteness” in 
NL requirements when compared to the fault-checklist method. Using a 5-point likert scale (ranging 
from “very low” to “very high”, the participants rated the NLtoSTD-BB method on eight different 
attributes related to its usability during the inspection. The results showed that only the simplicity and 
easy-to-understand attributes were rated significantly positive (i.e., mean response was significantly 
greater than 3 – the midpoint of the scale). The subjects response to post-study questionnaire revealed 
that, it was, sometimes, difficult to choose Sc, T, and Sn values when translating NL into STD-BBs for 
the requirements. Furthermore, analyzing the fault record forms provides insights that the NLtoSTD-BB 
method has limitations where there are multiple requirements specified for a single functionality, that 
causes the users to select from multiple candidate values of STD-BB elements (i.e., Sc, T, Sn) causing 
an incorrect transformation of NL requirements.  
Virtual Requirements Prototyping (VRP) 
The primary motivation behind VRP is to provide a requirements validation approach that 
overcomes drawbacks of current approaches we mentioned in Section I and brings stakeholders into the 
validation process. Validation generally addresses the question of whether the right system has been 
built. This question can be best answered by various stakeholders, such as customers, domain experts, 
and end-users, who typically are the ones requesting the system-to-be. Inspection is one of the widely 
accepted and used validation techniques because it is relatively easy to apply and it does not require 
technical knowledge for stakeholders to use it, but it is error prone due to human limitations in finding 
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faults in documents describing complicated embedded systems. Therefore, requirement engineers often 
seek to validate requirements in ways that minimize human errors, but this means they need to use 
techniques that extend beyond the technical expertise of non-technical stakeholders This creates a 
situation in which stakeholders (e.g., endusers and domain experts), who should be performing the 
validation, may not be able to do so, because requirement engineers could be the only qualified people 
who can perform the validation using such techniques. In developing the concept of VRP, we were 
motivated by several factors that allow for stakeholders’ participation. These factors include: 1) The use 
of a virtual prototype that allows the stakeholders to validate through their interactions; 2) Stakeholders 
can incrementally create the prototype themselves through a question-based means of transforming NL 
requirements into a Virtual Prototype (VP); based on a concept we developed called NLtoSTD [76]. 
Stakeholders can evaluate the VP by using a technique we developed called SQ Querying, which is a 
question answer based approach of interrogating a set of requirement with Scenario Questions [64]. We 
facilitate the asking of questions by using matrix based user-interfaces. To answer the stakeholder’s 
questions, we use easy-to-read path strings and requirement scenarios, which will be covered in detail. 
Lastly, with the emphasis of human involvement, the VRP supporting tool will incorporate automated 
reasoning. 
VRP is an approach to validating NL functional requirements by transforming them into a 
virtual prototype that stakeholders can then interact with. There are three major phases to VRP. Each 
phase can be revisited at any time during the course of validating a set of requirements. The three phases 
are as shown in Figure 7, and are listed as follows. 
1)  Virtual Prototype Creation Phase Users transform the Natural Language (NL) requirements into 
a Virtual Prototype (VP). In this phase NL ambiguities can be greatly reduced, because the 
transformation process forces a reevaluation of the users’ true intention, as worded in the requirements. 
The transformation process is such that a direct one-to-one trace between each NL requirement and a 
building block of the VP is established.  
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Figure 7. An overview of Virtual Requirement Prototype 
2)  Virtual Prototype Correction Phase Users make any necessary initial corrections in the VP’s 
structure. In particular, users address gaps in the VP, which are direct reflections of the incompleteness 
in the NL requirements. Since the first phase established a direct one-to-one trace between NL 
requirements and the VP, any corrections made to the VP can instantly be mapped back to the 
responsible NL requirement. 
3)  Virtual Prototype Evaluation Phase After the initial corrections have been made to the VP, it is 
ready for the users’ evaluation. This phase exercises VP behavior, and uses STD traversal path strings 
and requirement scenarios to expose defects, including inconsistencies. 
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THE CCM APPROACH 
Overview of the Causal Component Model CCM  
The Causal Component Model (CCM) has been made cognitive friendly through repeated 
experimentation, and can potentially be automated in the future by using a Part-Of-Speech (POS) tagger.  
CCM was developed to provide the following factors deemed necessary for this research. 
1) The model must capture system behavior, since the goal is the exposure of ONBs. A common 
means of modeling behavior is using the concept of a state machine (a.k.a. State Transition 
Diagram (STD)). For example, UML models such as Activity Diagrams, State Charts, 
Collaboration Diagrams, and Sequence Diagrams are built around the concept of a state 
machine. State machines are intuitive, fairly easy to understand, and used in other aspects of the 
development cycle (such as the design phase); this gives them a high degree of familiarity. More 
importantly, for our purposes, state machines can be modeled mathematically as. graphs, which 
enables the automated manipulation and analysis of a state machine. 
2) The model should be systematically constructible by stakeholders with varying degrees of 
technical training, since we are exposing ONBs during the requirements phase. This promotes 
stakeholder involvement, when possible. A CCM is constructed using a four step process, with 
each step centered on the concept of a component state. A high degree of specification detail can 
be sacrificed for ease of construction, since in requirements we are primarily interested in 
capturing WHAT a system is supposed to do, and not HOW it is supposed to do it; the “how” is 
left to the design and implementation phases. 
3) Since the goal is to expose ONBs caused by the operating environment, the model must abstract 
environmental causes from system causes. CCM is designed to differentiate transitions cause by 
the environment from those caused by the system. 
  
 45 
 
Figure 8. Example of a Causal Component Model (CCM) 
4) The preferred model should be readily converted into rules. A rule-based approach offers 
several advantages. Rules have an IF THEN structure which can readily define the transition 
between two given states. The rules can, in turn, be used to construct a state machine. Rules can be 
forward chained, allowing for the automatic transversal of a state machine. The IF-THEN 
structure of a rule can also be translated into structured English, which in turn can be read as a 
requirement by any stakeholder. For future research, rules can form an expert system which 
allows for the querying of a set of requirements. 
The Causal Component Model (CCM) achieves all of the above stated objectives, and plays a 
central role in both ONB approaches developed in this research.  Figure 8 shows the CCM of a simple 
motor controller, from which we make the following observations. A CCM consists of interrelated state 
transition diagrams (STD), with each STD modeling the behavior of a system component. The 
components in this example are Motor, Switch, and Temp_Sensor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that each STD models how that component will transition between its various component-
states, designated as component(state). For example, switch(on) can transit to switch(off) and back 
again. The STD’s are interrelated by virtue of the fact that transitions in one given STD is determined by 
the component state of one or more of the other STD’s in the system. The CCM is designed to model a 
synchronous system, where each component may or may not change states concurrently, on a given 
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clock cycle. Thus, whether a given component in one STD changes states, depends on the state of the 
other components, at the time of that clock cycle. For example, in Figure 8, the motor will transit from 
motor(on) to motor(off) if and only if the switch is on (switch(on)) OR if the temp_sensor is sensing a 
safe operating temperature (temp_sensor(safe)). Note that the USER’s interaction with the system is also 
captured; it is treated like an external component-state, and referred to as an environmental cause. By 
convention environmental causes are capitalized. Other environmental causes can include the ambient 
temperature of the system’s operating environment, in this case written: TEMP(>100), and TEMP(<80). 
Overall the CCM is component-state dependent, and provides a high-level view of the system. 
To construct a CCM the stakeholders only need to specify the state-based behavior of the system 
components, and how those behaviors interrelated. This keeps the system specification focused on 
“what” the system is supposed to do, without straying into “how” the system is supposed to achieve its 
behavior. The “how” is left up to the design phase, as it should be. We propose that this high level view 
is sufficient to expose incompleteness stemming from off-nominal behaviors, while being easy to 
conceive by non-technical stakeholders who should not be distracted by the details of the system’s 
design. 
Creation of a CCM 
To elicit a set of requirements directly into a CCM, a stakeholder is required to follow a four 
step process, where each step involves the elicitation of one of the model’s four artifacts: Components, 
Component-States, Component-State Transitions, and the Causes of Component-State Transitions. The 
four steps proceed as follows: 
Step 1: Determine Components Elicit a set of system components, as expressed in the 
requirements.  A component is part of a system’s composition that can change states and/or cause a 
change in state. For example, in a motor controller system, the components can consist of {Switch, 
Temp_Sensor, Motor, Timer}. Note that a potential subsystem, such as the Timer, can also be 
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considered a component. It is up to the stakeholders to determine how they want to decompose a system 
into components, allowing for different abstraction levels of abstraction. 
Step 2: Determine Component-States.  Elicit a set of component-states for each component as 
expressed in the requirements. A component-state is the state of a component at a given instance of time. 
For example a set of component-states (expressed Component(State)) for the components of step 1 
would be: {Switch(off), Switch(on), Temp_Sensor(safe), Temp_Sensor(overheated), Motor(off), 
Motor(on), Timer(set), Timer(expired)} 
Step 3: Determine Transitions Between Component-states. Elicit the set of transitions between 
component-states, forming a state transition diagram (STD) for each component as expressed in the 
requirements. For example, some the of the transitions between the component(states) of step 2 could be 
Switch(off)  Switch(on), Switch(on) Switch(off),  Temp_Sensor(safe)  
Temp_Sensor(overheated),  Temp_Sensor(overheated)  Temp_Sensor(safe), 
Motor(off)  Motor(on), and Motor(on)  Motor(off). 
Step 4: Determine the Component-states that cause the Transitions. To model an entire system, 
we must capture the way the various component(state0 transitions interact with one another. Causal 
relationships allow for the modeling of interactions between concurrent behaviors in a system. For 
example, a user pressing a switch will cause the switch to change states: USER(press) : Switch(off)  
Switch(on).  A change is temperature will cause the temperature sensor to change states: TEMP(>100) : 
Temp_Sensor(safe)  Temp_Sensor(overheated). A logical combination of switch and temperature 
sensor states will, in turn, cause a change in the motor’s states: Switch(on)   ^ Temp_Sensor(safe) : 
Motor(off) Motor(on) or  Switch(off) : Motor(on)  Motor(off). 
Note that central to the four step process is the elicitation of component-states. Once system’s 
component-states have been accessed, the goal is to establish how these component-states interact with 
one another in both a transitional and causal relationship. The intent was to have a translation process 
that can be performed with minimal stakeholder training. The emphasis on determining component-
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states also provides the possibility of automating the translation process at some future time. This could 
be possibility achieved using s syntax tagger, which parses a NL sentence into nouns, verbs, adverbs, 
etc.  
Definition of Terms and Constraints 
The following is a list of the terms that will be referred to throughout this article. Included is a 
summary of the constraints associated with each concept express.  
Components 
  A component is something in the system that can change states and/or cause a change in state. 
Typically a component can be viewed as the smallest functional unit that forms the composition of the 
system, but it does not necessarily need be, as it can also be a subsystem. This means that different 
levels of abstraction that can be modeled. 
Component(State) 
A component(state) is the state of a component at a given instance of time. For now we use the 
term state (typically nouns) versus actions (verbs), although we can treat an action as a state in the 
following manner. Suppose the Motor is in state of overheating. We could declare Motor(overHeating) 
as a Component(State). Generally there is a lot liberty in this area, and we allow whatever verbiage 
makes grammatical sense to the stakeholders. We view a system as a set C of interacting components c, 
that can each assume a component state s, express as c(s).  
System State 
A system state sys is global state, that represents the simultaneous status of all the component 
states at an instance of time, and can be expressed as: sys = (c1(sn), c2(sn), c3(sn), . . ., cn(sn)). To facilitate 
algorithmic manipulation, we can assign both component states and system states a numeric value 
derived from how the component states are entered into a table on the support tool. In the table, the 
components are entered as rows, and states are entered as columns.  
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The ordinal position of components and states is then used to generate a numeric value. Table 2 
illustrates the numeric values (e.g. 0.2.0.) generated when entering three components and two states. 
From the Table 2 we derive: c2(s1) = 0.1.0., because c1 is in the second row (thus second position), and 
s1 is in the first column (thus, a value of 1). All numeric values have N positions, whenever there are N 
components. 
Table 2. Component state entry table showing numeric value of component states 
 
 S1 S2 . . . Sn 
C1 1.0.0. 2.0.0. . . . n.0.0. 
C2 0.1.0. 0.2.0. . . . 0.n.0. 
C3 0.0.1. 0.0.2. . . . 0.0.n. 
 
Numeric values also allows for the combining of component states, into one number, (e.g. c1(s1)   
  c3(s2) = 1.0.0. + 0.0.2. = 1.0.2.) Note that the zeroes are an indication of ambiguities in the 
requirements, since they represent component states that have not been explicitly defined. 
Component(State) Transitions 
Component transitions relate two given Component(state)s (of the same component) to one 
another. They describe how a given component state transitions to another component state. The one 
hard fast rule surrounding the transitions between Component(State)s is that they only occur between 
the Component(State)s of the same component. One of the goal of the CCM is to model each 
component’s behavior as it occurs in that component’s domain. Thus, while Motor(off)  Motor(on) is 
allowed, StartSwitch(off)  Motor(on) is strictly forbidden.  
System Cause 
A cause for a transition that originates from within the system itself, consisting of one or more 
component(state)s from a component other than the component experiencing the transition. For 
example, the following is not allowed: Motor(stalled) : Motor(on)  Motor(off) whereas this is 
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allowed:  Switch(off) : Motor(on)  Motor(off). Perhaps in some future iteration of the CCM we will 
extend its expressiveness to components being the cause of their own transitions, but for now it is 
restricted. 
Environmental Cause 
An environmental cause that originates from the system’s operating environment. This can take 
the form of a state (or even an action) that a physical property can experience, such as 
TEMPERATURE(at100_degrees), or a shorthand version with a range: TEMP(>100). It can also be a 
USER performing a certain action, or a SENSOR reacting to a trip point. We can take more liberties 
with the semantics of Environmental Causes, since they need be more expressive. The convention is to 
capitalize environmental causes, for easy differentiating when reading the subsequent rules. 
Compound Cause 
A compound cause is a logical combination of two or more causes. An example is found in 
Figures 1, 3, and 4, namely: StartSwitch(on) ^ TempSensor(safe), which reads as StartSwitch(on) 
logically ANDed with TempSensor(safe). The other valid logical operator is OR. At present a NOT is 
not used, because the nature of CCM is the causal relationship between STD’s. The absence of a 
specified cause is the equivalent of a logical “NOT”. 
Causal Relationships 
To model an entire system, we must capture the way the various components interact with one 
another. Causal relationships allow for the modeling of interactions between concurrent behaviors in a 
system. At this point in its development, the CCM is used to model synchronous systems, which means 
that all transitions occur on a given system Transition (T). Thus, each CCM expression actually has a T 
term ANDed with the system cause or environmental cause, although not explicitly stated. For example 
the expression StartSwitch(on) ^ TempSensor(safe) : Motor(off)  Motor(on) actually has the 
transition term “T”, and can be written as T ^ StartSwitch(on) ^ TempSensor(safe) : Motor(off)  
Motor(on). However, the “T” is implied in an environmental cause.  
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F : X  Y
F : X(a)  Y(b)
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X
a b
F : X(a)  X(b)
 
Figure 9. The CCM formal notation is based on function notation 
 
CCM Translation Rules 
CCM translation rules are the textual version of the CCM. They define the structure that a CCM 
would have in graphical form. They are based on the definition for a function mapping: F : X  Y, 
where X and Y are the same component domain. This is because each expression defines a mapping 
from one component state to another as a function of another component state.  A transition rule can also 
take a symbolic or numerical form, but not combinations of the various forms. An example of a CCM 
transition rule is TempSensor(safe) : Motor(off)  Motor(on), which reads: the Motor will transition 
from off to on if the TempSensor is in a safe state.  
To develop the rule notation, we built upon the function notation that specifies the mapping of 
elements between two domains, commonly expressed as F : X  Y . The reason for doing so is because 
a CCM rule must be able to represent a mapping between two component(state)s (C(s)). Furthermore, 
this mapping must be dependent on some transition (function) F. On the left-hand side of Figure 9, the 
function notion, F : X  Y , specifies that function F maps element “a” from domain X to element “b” 
in co-domain Y .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
We use the notations X(a) and Y(b) to denote that “a” and “b” are within the domain of 
components X and Y respectively. For our purposes, we will now assume that X = Y and restrict the 
function F to within one component. The reason for doing so is because we want the CCM notation to 
map transitions within the same component, and not between two separate components. Thus, on the 
right-hand side of Figure 9, we redefine the function F as a transition that maps “a” to “b” within 
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[F2] [F3] S3
 
 
Figure 10. Three transitions within a component (C1). C2 is a second component 
 
 
component X. We replace X with C, “a” with S1, and “b” with S2, which represents a component 
containing states S1 and S2, and replace F with inter-component transition T; this gives us T : C(S1) 
C(S2). In a real world example, a component would likely have more than two states. These various 
states would be interconnected via a set of transition functions.  
The left hand side of Figure 10 shows an example of a component C1 that has three states (S1, 
S2, and S3), with three transitions (T1, T2, and T3). Since the CCM is geared toward embedded systems 
it is important that we be able to model concurrency. To do so, we need the ability to simultaneously 
represent more than one component, and their transitioning states. Figure 10 shows two component (C1 
and C2), and their corresponding states. In Figure 10, each component has their states interconnected in 
a state transition diagram (STD). Each STD can act independently and thus concurrently with the other 
components. Components C1 and C2 of Figure 4, each has three transitions, labeled F1, F2, and F3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A transition cause can be a single component(state) or a logical combination of 
component(state)s. By using component(state)s the cause of a transition we establish the casual 
relationship between the component(state)s of two components within the system boundary. The CCM 
requires that we view a set of requirements as a collection of statements that describe how various 
system components interrelate with one another on a causation basis [161]. The CCM consists of a set of 
 53 
 
Figure 11. Simple CCM example 
 
interrelated state transition systems with each transition system modeling the behavior of a specific 
system component. Each component’s behavior occurs concurrently with the other components, and the 
CCM models how one component’s behavior affects another component’s behavior. Figure 11 shows an 
example of a simple CCM where a switch turns on a motor, and 3 seconds later, the motor turns off. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our approach begins with the manual translation of requirements into translation rules, which 
we now define.  Let EC be the set of all possible causes originating from the environment, and ec   EC 
be a given cause. Let CS be the set of all component states, and cs CS, a given component state. We 
define a set of Environmentally Caused translation Rules (ECR) : ECR = {ecr│ecr = cc : csp → csn, csp  
Cn(Sp), csn  Cn(Sn)}, where (cc = ce, ce  Ec) or (cc = ce  cs2 . . .  csn, csn Cn(Sp), csn Cn(Sn)). 
Note that the component portion of the component state must be the same for both (csp, csn). ecr : csp → 
csn  is a mapping notation which reads ecr ECR causes component  c to transition from its present 
state sp  to its next state sn. Recall that, component-states, CSp and CSn can also assume a numerical 
value, yielding, in a system of three components, for example: ec : 1.0.0. → 2.0.0.  
We define a set of System Caused translation Rules as: SCR = {scr│scr = sc : csp → csn, csp  
Cn(Sp), csn   Cn(Sn)} Where (sc = csx, csx Cn(Sp),csx Cn(Sn)) or (sc = cs1  cs2 . . .  csn, csn 
Cn(Sp), csn Cn(Sn)). Numerically, a member of ECR can have the form ec : 0.1.0. → 0.2.0., whereas 
a member of SCR can be  0.0.3.   1.0.0. : 0.1.0. → 0.2.0., and further simplified to 1.0.3. : 0.1.0. → 
0.2.0. 
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Absorption and Propagation Operations 
In numerical form, a translation rule contains zeroes which results in ambiguous multiple 
interpretations of a given rule. Translation rules must be made explicit through what we call expansion. 
Before the translation rules are expanded, we require that they be subjected to a process called 
absorption which absorbs the cause on the rule’s right-side. For members of ECR, rules in the form of ec 
  cxs : cysp → cysn, must be converted to ec : cxs   cysp → cysn. For SCR members, rules in the form 
of tc   cxs : cysp → cysn become tc : cxs   cysp → cysn, because component--states ANDed with a 
cause are treated as preconditions for that given transition. As such, they are ANDed with the present 
states.  
When the rules are in numerical form, absorption becomes a matter of shifting digits from the 
cause to the present state; e.g., tc    0.0.3.    1.0.0. : 0.1.0. → 0.2.0.  becomes tc : 1.1.3. → 0.2.0.  The 
propagation process further reduces the number of zeroes by shifting digits from the present state to the 
next state. Thus, tc : 1.1.3. → 0.2.0. becomes tc : 1.1.3. → 1.2.3., because every translation rule defines 
a change in only one component--state; therefore, we cannot assume that other component--states have 
changed at the same time.    
CCM Symbolic Rules 
A CCM expression can be translated into a symbolic form by using letters to represent 
components, and numbers to represent a component’s state. The assignment of letters and numbers is 
based on the order in which components and states are entered into a CCM entry table.  
For example, if the following components are entered in the following order: {StartSwitch, 
TempSensor, Motor}, then the StartSwitch is represented with an A, the TempSensor with a B, and the 
Motor with a C. Thus, {StartSwitch, TempSensor, Motor} = <A, B, C>.  
Let us further assume that the three components each have two states resulting in the following 
list of component states: {StartSwitch(off), StartSwitch(on), TempSensor(safe), 
TempSensor(overHeat), Motor(off), Motor(on)}. Since each component has two states, the states are 
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numbered 1 and 2 according to the order that they appear in, resulting in the symbolic list  {A(1), A(2), 
B(1), B(2), C(1), C(2)}. If we apply these symbols to the following CCM expression: TempSensor(safe) 
: Motor(off)  Motor(on), we get the symbolic expression B(1) : C(1)  C(2). 
CCM Numeric Representation 
A CCM symbolic rule can be translated into a numeric representation for automatic analysis and 
manipulation. The numeric values are derived from the ordinal values of the components and their 
respective states, after they are entered into the support tool entry grid. Going from symbolic to numeric 
the ordinal values of the components are taken from the ordinal position of the alphabet. For example, 
the following symbolic expression: T ^ B(1) : C(1)  C(2) translates into the numeric representation T 
: 011  012. For the moment note that T : 011  012 indicates that at transition T, we don’t care how 
component A transitions (indicated by a 0), component B will remain at state 1, and C will transition 
from state 1 to state 2. As we will see in section 5, there is useful information encoded in the numeric 
representation. Figure 12 shows how a CCM translates to symbolic and numerical representation. Again, 
this translation is perform within a support tool, and is typically kept transparent to the stakeholders. The 
primary purpose of a numeric representation is to facilitate the automatic analysis of the CCM. A 
secondary use is for the creation of a Kripke structure for use with an explicit model checker. Lastly, 
both a symbolic and numeric represent can serve as a framework for further research into ways of 
analyzing requirements that have been translated into a CCM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56 
StartSwitch(off)
StartSwitch(on)
[USER
(pressesOff)] 
[USER
(pressedOn)] 
Motor(off) Motor(on)
TempSensor(safe)
[TEMP
(<80)] 
[TEMP
(>100)] 
[StartSwitch(off) v TempSensor(overheat)] 
[StartSwitch(on) ^ TempSensor(safe)] 
TempSensor(overheat)
USER(pressedOn) : A(1)  A(2)
USER(pressesOff) : A(2)  A(1)
TEMP(>100) : B(1)  B(2)
TEMP(<80) : B(2)  B(1)
A(2) ^ B(1) : C(1)  C(2)
A(1) v B(2) : C(2)  C(1)
USER(pressedOn) : 100  200
USER(pressesOff) : 200  100
TEMP(>100) : 010  020
TEMP(<80) : 020  010
T : 211  212
T : 102  101
T : 022  021
C(1) C(2)
[A(1) v B(2)] 
[A(2) ^ B(1)] 
=
A(1)
A(2)
[USER
(pressesOff)] 
[USER
(pressedOn)] 
B(1)
[TEMP
(<80)] 
[TEMP
(>100)] 
B(2)
1
2
3
Causal Component Model (CCM)
Symbolic Causal Component Model (CCM)
Symbolic CCM Rules
Numeric CCM Rules
 
Figure 12. Symbolic and numeric representation of CCM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The upper half of Figure 12 shows the motor controller CCM (left hand) and its numeric 
expression (right hand). The bottom half of Figure 12 shows the three symbolic intermediary steps 
between the CCM and its numeric version.  
Labeled Transition System (LTS) 
For our purposes, We define a state transition system as a tuple {S, R} where S is a set of states 
and R  is a set of binary relations S S over S, known as transitions. For example, for {s1, s2}   S, we 
say that there is a transition from s1 to s2 expressed as (s1  s2). Figure 13 shows a LTS (labeled B) that 
was created from a CCM (labeled A). The CCM consists of three components {StartSwitch, 
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Figure 13. Comparison of CCM (A) and a Labeled Transition System (B) 
 
TempSensor, Motor}, and four component states {StartSwitch(off), StartSwitch(on), TempSensor(safe), 
TempSensor(overheat), Motor(off), Motor(on)}. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 shows that the CCM can be converted into a Labeled Transition System (LTS) in 
which the nodes display a snapshot of the system’s global state at a given instance of time. Each 
transition in a LTS shows how the system goes from one global state to another. Each of the system’s 
component-state is factored into each global system state. For example, the initial system state of our 
on-going motor controller example might be {StartSwitch(off), TempSensor(safe), Motor(off)}. Note that 
the component states of all three components are combined into the system state. In Figure 13B the 
system states are represented in numeric form, thus the initial state {StartSwitch(off), TempSensor(safe), 
Motor(off)} is shown as 111. To continue the example, the LTS of Figure 13 shows a transition from 
111  211 when the USER pressed the StartSwitch ON. In others words, the system transitioned from 
{StartSwitch(off), TempSensor(safe), Motor(off)}  {StartSwitch(on), TempSensor(safe), Motor(off)}. A 
LTS is an effective means of analyzing a system that has two or more components behaving 
concurrently. For a system with N number of components, their concurrent behaviors can be analyzed in 
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Figure 14. Conversion of CCM to Labeled Transition System 
any possible combination. For example, from the LTS of Figure 14 we can trace the various paths that 
go from {StartSwitch(off), _, Motor(off)} to {StartSwitch(on), _, Motor(on)}, while ignoring the 
behavior of the TempSensor (one such path 111  211  212, the TempSensor number (010) never 
changes from 1. In a typical set of requirements the LTS structure would be too large to display, but not 
too large to create internally within the support tool.  Therefore, the analysis of the LTS occurs 
internally, after the tool has converted the CCM to a LTS. Note, from Figure 14, that the CCM is first 
converted into its numeric representation (step 1) and then  the zeroes are filled in with every possible 
system state combination to form an expanded set of expressions that specify every possible transition 
path in the system (step 2). These path specifications are combined internally to create the LTS (step 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State Profiles 
There are four variables that apply to a given system state. The variables are as follows: the 
number of in-degrees, the type of in-degree, the number of out-degrees, and the type of out-degree. The 
number and type of in-degrees are expressed in two sets, TID and EID. TID is defined as T transition In-
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Figure 15. Example of state profiling an LTS 
 
Degree; it is the set of in-degrees for a state that comes from paths labeled “T.x.” EID is defined as 
Environment In-Degree; it is the set of in-degrees for a state that comes from paths with an 
environmental cause. The number and type of out-degrees are expressed in two sets, TOD and EOD. 
TOD is defined as T transition Out-Degree; it is the set of out-degrees from a state that comes from 
paths labeled “T.x.” EOD is defined as Environment Out-Degree; it is the set of out-degrees for a state 
that comes from paths with an environmental cause. We can combine information about the four 
variables, as it applies to each system state, using what we call an ID-OD matrix. Figure 15 shows the 
ID-OD matrix for an example of a LTS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ID-OD matrix shows the sets of in-degrees and out-degrees for all the system states. For 
example, state 2.2 has a set EOD of two out-degrees from the two environmental paths labeled 5 and 6. 
As we will see in a later section, the TID, EID, TOD, and EOD (and their cardinal numbers) are use to 
profile a given system and determine whether that state plays a role in an off-nominal behavior. 
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StartSwitch(off)
StartSwitch(on)
[USER
(pressesOff)] 
[USER
(pressedOn)] 
Motor(off) Motor(on)
TempSensor(safe)
[TEMP
(<80)] 
[TEMP
(>100)] 
[StartSwitch(off) 
v TempSensor(overheat)] 
[StartSwitch(on) 
^ TempSensor(safe)] 
TempSensor(overheat)
Causal Component Model (CCM)
NFR1: The system shall consist of a start switch,
a motor, and a temperature sensor that monitors
the motor’s operating temperature.
FR1: The motor shall turn on if the user presses
the start switch.
FR2: The motor shall turn off if the user releases
the start switch.
FR3: The motor shall turn off if it’s temperature 
sensor senses a temperature above 100 degrees.
FR4: The motor shall be allowed to turn on only if
it’s temperature is below 80 degrees.
Natural Language Requirements
1
USER(presses) : StartSwitch(off)  StartSwitch(on)
USER(releases) : StartSwitch(on)  StartSwitch(off)
TEMP(>100) : TempSensor(safe)  TempSensor(overheat)
TEMP(<80) : TempSensor(overheat)  TempSensor(safe)
StartSwitch(on)  ^ TempSensor(safe)  : 
Motor(off) Motor(on)
StartSwitch(off) : Motor(on) Motor(off)
TempSensor(overheat) : Motor(on) Motor(off)
CCM Translation Rules (non-numeric form)
2
 
Figure 16. Example of CCM derived from a set of NL requirements 
 
Example  Application  of CCM  
Figure 16 shows an example of a Causal Component Model for a set of requirements describing 
a simple motor controller. The arrows in Figure 16 show the progression from NL requirements to CCM 
translation rules. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the CCM of Figure 16, we make the following observations. Note that each system 
component mentioned in the requirements {StartSwitch, TempSensor, Motor} is represented in the 
CCM. Each component’s possible state is also represented, using the notation Component(State).  
The StartSwitch has two states “on” and “off”, which is written as {StartSwitch(off), 
StartSwitch(on)}. The other two sets of component states are {TempSensor(safe), 
TempSensor(overheat)} and {Motor(off), Motor(on)}.  
Each set of component states are used to create a State Transition Diagram (STD) that describes 
the behavior of that given component.  
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Note that in the case of the Motor’s STD, the transitions are caused by the component states of 
both the StartSwitch and the TempSensor.  This is where the concept of a causality between components 
comes in (thus the name Causal Component Model). A CCM consists of a set of interleaving STDs, 
where each STD describes a system component behavior, and each component’s behavior depends on 
the behavior of the other components. A CCM describes a synchronous system, in which all the 
components can transition concurrently, as enabled by the states of the other components in the system. 
The state of a CCM at any given time Tn (considered a snapshot of the CCM) is the combination of all 
the concurrent component states at that given time. The next state the CCM will transition depending on 
the present CCM state. Thus the CCM models the independency between concurrent component 
behaviors. 
The CCM is a very high level, abstract, representation of a system, which focuses on specifying 
what a system is supposed to do, without concern over the details of how it is supposed to do it. Note 
that  the transitional causes of the StartSwitch and TempSensor. are capitalized by conversion to signify 
that these causes are from the system’s operating environment. This ability of the CCM to differentiate 
between causes occurring from the environment (outside the system) from the causes occurring within 
the system allows a more complete formal examination of the CCM. Figure 16 shows that the creation 
of a CCM from a requirements document and/or direct elicitation involves a four step process that 
centers around the determination of component states and their interactions with one another. 
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The CCM captures and separates the transitional causes that come from the environment from those that 
come from within the system itself. This enables the formal differentiation of the system and its 
operating environment. The four steps are 1) Determining system components, 2) their respective  
 
The focus on component states was conceived in order to achieve a high degree of cognitive 
friendliness. With minimal, if any, training, determining the necessary system components, and their 
respective states, is a task within the ability of most stakeholders be they technical or non-technical. 
Domain experts should also have the ability to surmise what components would make up a system-to-
be, since a component is a fundamental building block of a system, and people tend to build things from 
lower to higher levels of complexity. Note from Figure 17 that once a set of component states are 
determined (Step 2), the remaining task is determining how those component states interact with one 
another (Steps 3 and 4), as dictated by the desired system behaviors. The actual gathering of data for 
each step is performed using an entry table, as shown in Figure 18.  
The CCM entry table of Figure 17 is a mockup of the table used in a support tool.  Steps 2 and 3 
show that the approach takes the entered data and create a CCM (step 2) or a set of CCM expressions.  
 
 
 
Figure 17. Example of the four step CCM creation process 
 
 63 
StartSwitch(on) AND 
TempSensor(safe)
USER(pressedOn) StartSwitch(off)
Next Comp(State)Cause Pre Comp(State)
StartSwitch(on)
TempSensor(safe) TempSensor(overHeat)
StartSwitch(off)StartSwitch(on)
TempSensor(overHeat) TempSensor(safe)
Motor(off) Motor(on)
Motor(on) Motor(off)
Motor(on) Motor(off)TempSensor(overHeat)
StartSwitch(off)
USER(pressesOff)
TEMP(>100)
TEMP(<80)
NFR1: The system shall consist of a start switch,
a motor, and a temperature sensor that monitors
the motor’s operating temperature.
FR1: The motor shall turn on if the user presses
the start switch.
FR2: The motor shall turn off if the user releases
the start switch.
FR3: The motor shall turn off if it’s temperature 
sensor senses a temperature above 100 degrees.
FR4: The motor shall be allowed to turn on only if
it’s temperature is below 80 degrees.
1. Determine 
Components
2. Determine 
Component 
States
3. Determine 
Transitions 
between 
component 
states
4. Determine the 
component 
states that cause 
the transitions
Natural Language Requirements CCM Entry Table
Four Step CCM
Creation Process
USER(presses) : StartSwitch(off)  StartSwitch(on)
USER(releases) : StartSwitch(on)  StartSwitch(off)
TEMP(>100) : TempSensor(safe)  TempSensor(overheat)
TEMP(<80) : TempSensor(overheat)  TempSensor(safe)
StartSwitch(on)  ^ TempSensor(safe)  : 
Motor(off) Motor(on)
StartSwitch(off) : Motor(on) Motor(off)
TempSensor(overheat) : Motor(on) Motor(off)
CCM Rules
1
2 3
StartSwitch(off)
StartSwitch(on)
[USER
(pressesOff)] 
[USER
(pressedOn)] 
Motor(off) Motor(on)
TempSensor(safe)
[TEMP
(<80)] 
[TEMP
(>100)] 
[StartSwitch(off) v TempSensor(overheat)] 
[StartSwitch(on) ^ TempSensor(safe)] 
TempSensor(overheat)
Causal Component Model (CCM)
 
Figure 18. Example use of a CCM entry table 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The conception and use of the CCM rules will be addressed in greater details in chapter 6. For 
now, the reader should note that CCM expressions are a notational (non-graphical) means of defining a 
CCM that allow for the converting of a CCM to a Labeled Transition System, a Petri-net, and a 
symbolic/numerical representation used for property checking. The expressions can also be used to 
create a NuSMV script for use with a symbolic model checker. The expressions have a IF-THEN 
structure that facilitates the mapping into the language used in NuSMV. Finally, the CCM expressions 
can also be used to covert a CCM into a set of rule-based NL requirements, for documentations 
purposes.  
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Figure 19. Levels of abstraction possible 
 
Levels of Abstraction Possible with the CCM 
The translation rules, and associated CCM, represent a system at a high level of abstraction, 
defining what a system is supposed to do. The component--state can be used as both nodes and edges in 
the set of interrelated transition diagrams that form a CCM. Consequently, we can model the system at 
various levels of granularity by varying the number of component--states used to represent the system. 
This ability, in turn, helps manage the potential state-explosion problem. There are four possible (but not 
exclusive) levels of abstraction that can be modeled with the CCM; they are labeled A, B, C, and D in 
Figure 19. With all four examples, the switch is represented using the component(state) notation: A and 
B use {Switch(off), Switch(on)} while C and D use {Switch(UserPresses), Switch (UserReleases)}. A and 
B represent the switch as a node while C and D represent the switch as the cause of a transition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Each example in Figure 18 shows a tradeoff between the granularity of the representation and 
the number of potential system states. Example A results in 6 system states (2 x 2 x 2). At the other 
extreme, Example C offers less detail but only produces two system states. Note also that, with Example 
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C (as well as D), the switch has been consolidated with the USER so that both the user and switch are 
still represented in the model. Thus, in Examples C and D, we have the ability to model the switch 
component as a cause and to avoid the additional system states that the switch would produce if it were a 
component. Thus, when trying to manage a possible state explosion, the preferred modeling scheme is 
either Example C or D, whereas input sensors are treated as a cause.  
Overview of the Approaches to the ONBP 
The research pertaining to this dissertation resulted in two approaches to addressing the ONBP.  
1) We made model checking itself cognitive friendly by using CCM as a model checker’s front-end. We 
refer to this as the Property Checking Approach (PCA). 2) We developed a cognitive friendly approach 
that achieves the end result of model checking, by extending CCM into a rules-based ONB checker; 
referred to as the State Profiling Approach (SPA).  Since both approaches are state-based and analyze 
functional requirements using path traversal, they are well suited to the problem of exposing 
susceptibility of off-nominal behaviors in a set of embedded requirements. 
Property Checking Approach 
The Property Checking Approach (PCA) uses the CCM as a front end to a model checker. The 
CCM converts a set of requirements into a set of IF THEN statements that forms the model specification 
portion of a NuSMV model checking script. Part of the CCM information is also used with temporal 
logic templates, to create the script’s temporal logic properties. The model checker can answer questions 
such as “Can a given undesired system state be avoided regardless of off-nominal behaviors from the 
environment.” If the answer is no, the model checker provides a counter-example which shows the 
ONBs that result in an undesired state. The results are reported to the stakeholders, who then addresses 
the problem by modifying the requirements accordingly. PCA proved to be effective in exposing ONBs, 
however it still required a considerable amount of manual post analysis on the model checker’s counter-
example, in order to deduce how to correct the exposed problem.   
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We felt that ONB corrections could be deduced more easily if we were not restricted to counter-
examples as our only source of information, since potentially useful metrics were confined to the 
internal operation of the model checker; metrics such as the number of global system states that contain 
an undesired combination of component states; all traversal paths other than just counter-examples 
resulting from failed properties; whether or not an undesired state is recoverable by the system.  This 
motivated the development of a more open frame approach referred to as State Profiling. 
State Profiling Approach 
If we define an ONB as an environmentally induced behavior that results in a non-system 
recoverable undesired state, then exposing a system’s susceptibility to ONBs requires the following 
items: 
1)  The identification of transitions between global system states.  
2) Differentiating the transitions caused by the environment from those caused by the system.  
3) Identifying those environmental transitions that lead to an undesired state, and the lack of those 
system transitions that would recover the system form the same undesired state. 
Because a NuSMV model checker does not explicitly represent (or differentiate) transitions in 
the resulting counter-examples, the NuSMV is not ideally suited for exposing ONB susceptibility.    
The reason for the lack of suitability is primarily due to the Transition System (TS) that a model checker 
(whether explicit or symbolic) uses internally to represent the model. The TS in question models the 
transitions among global system states without indicating an explicit cause of those transitions. 
Transitions occur on the basis that a given global state is the precondition of another global state (the 
transition cause is thus implicit in the global state).  
Furthermore, the temporal logic properties define state transitions, without regard to the cause of 
those transitions. That is to say, a temporal logic property is concerned with the eventual reachability of 
a given state, regardless of what transitional causes may result in that state being reached.  
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A way to model state transitions while explicitly differentiating the type of cause that results in those 
transitions is needed. A rule-based representation of a system achieves this, because implicit in the rule 
statement is the element of transition causality, as expressed in the IF-THEN semantics of the rule. 
For example, the CCM rule: “USER(setsTime) :  Timer(elapsed)  Timer(set) “ reads, IF the 
USER sets the time, THEN the timer will go from elapsed to being set. The cause of the Timer’s 
transition from elapsed to set is explicitly stated. 
Rules could then be classified as those describing environmental causes versus those describing 
system causes. Thus, the SPA  rule-based approach achieves the following items: 
1) Models system behavior as a series of transitions between global system states. 
2) Explicitly identifies the transitions between global system states. 
3) Differentiates the transitions caused by the environment from those caused by the system.  
4) Identifies those environmental transitions that lead to an undesired state. 
5) Exposes the lack of those system transitions that would recover the system from a given 
undesired state. 
In order to make environmental causes explicit, we eliminated the model checker, and extended 
CCM into a dedicated, open-frame, rule-based, requirements ONB checker. The State Profiling 
Approach (SPA) starts with the CCM represented as a set of translation rules containing ambiguities 
from the NL requirements. The use of rules allows for the direct interpretation of results, allowing for 
not just the exposing of ONBs, but for information suggesting how to avoid them. Algorithmically, 
every possible interpretation of those rules are produced, resulting in a set of explicit rules that describe 
both intended and unintended behaviors. Given a set of stakeholder-defined undesired states, the rules 
are screened to determine if any of the rules result in an undesired state. If so, those undesired states are 
profiled to determine if they are non-recoverable.  
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Once, a set of non-recoverable undesired states has been exposed, the cause of those undesired 
states are determined and reported to the stakeholders, who then address the problem by modifying the 
requirements accordingly. The rules also allow for a more direct exposure of ONBs, as opposed to 
having to analyze a system’s entire state space, as in the case of the model checker. This helps mitigate 
the state explosion problem, reduce computation time. Finally, the use of rules also allows for the 
exposure of incompleteness and inconsistencies in a set of requirements, without having to develop 
additional model checking temporal properties. To evaluate our approach we performed a case study 
using a commercial mini-excavator and exposed two instances of ONBs with a suggestion on how to fix 
them. 
Fundamental Differences Between Approaches 
The fundamental difference between PCA and SPA is the scope of their usefulness. PCA is a 
dedicated technique designed to specifically address the ONBP, whereas SPA is an analysis framework 
that can be applied to the ONBP as one of many possible applications. In the long term, SPA can be a 
more powerful analysis technique than PCA for the following reasons. Since the model checker is 
essentially treated as a block box, one can only work within the constraints of an input script, and a 
counterexample output, with all forms of analysis framed strictly as a reach-ability problem. Being a 
black box, the model checking algorithm is internal to the model checker, and cannot be directly 
analyzed using properties other than temporal. By contrast, SPA is not a black box, but rather provides 
direct access to all its algorithms. This makes PCA a dedicated technique, while SPA is a general 
purpose framework. For this reason SPA offers a greater contribution to long term ONB research, than 
PCA. Table 3 shows the key differences between PCA and SPA. 
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Table 3. Comparison between the property checking and state profiling approaches 
 
Property Checking Approach State Profiling Approach 
Needs entire system state space Needs only undesired state space 
Produces a counter example that must be 
interpreted via CCM simulation. 
Can produce a constraint requirement. 
No access to internal LTS. 
Rules are accessible; can also be used to produce 
a Petri net. 
No information beyond a counter-example 
from a failed property. 
Rules can be directly analyzed for additional 
information. Traversal information can be 
obtained whether or not property holds. 
Internal model cannot be partitioned. 
Rules can be used to model only E causes and/or  
T causes. 
Produces no additional metrics beyond 
pass/fail and counter-example. 
Can produce metrics such as numbers of E rules, 
number of T rules, number of occurrences of a 
given undesired state. 
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CCM PROPERTY CHECKING APPROACH (PCA) 
Overview 
The CCM can be used to address the ONBP using two different approaches: Property checking 
and state profiling. This section describes the former of the two. The Property Checking Approach 
(PCA) uses the CCM as a means of formalizing a set of requirements into a set of rules, whose 
properties could then be examined. Research was conducted into the possibility of directly property 
checking the rules derived from a CCM, however it was decided to utilize the well-established means of 
property checking, known as model checking.  
The properties in question are related to the reach-ability question, specifically whether an 
undesired system state can eventually be reached. A secondary question becomes, if an undesired state 
can be reached, what combinations of environmental causes result in that state? Both of these questions 
can be answered using model checking, which is designed to address reach-ability problems, and can 
provide path traces, in the form of a counter-examples. Thus, in the property checking approach, CCM 
serves as a front end to model checker. Figure 19 shows a detailed block diagram that emphasizes the 
user interface portion of the property checking approach.  
In Figure 19 we have highlighted in gray the CCM related elements that serve as a model 
checker front end. The CCM provides a cognitive friendly interface between the stakeholders and the 
model checker, facilitating the creation of both the model specification and the temporal properties. 
Model specifications for the model checker is created from the CCM Expressions {5}, and not from the 
Numeric Representation {6}, which is not used with the model checker. 
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Figure 20. Overview of the Property Checking Approach (PCA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The CCM expressions use an IF-THEN structure that maps directly to the IF-THEN verbiage 
used in the NuSMV script. The Temporal Properties {7} are produced using temporal property 
templates [Dwyer], by inserting the undesired system states in the State Entry table {1}. Other properties 
are automatically created by tool, by using information gathered in the CCM Entry Table {3}. Both the 
model specifications and the temporal specifications are used to create the NuSMV script, which in turn 
is used as the sole input to the NuSMV model checker {8}. The model checker determines if the model 
specified satisfies the temporal properties. If so, it returns a true for each property satisfied. If false, the 
checker returns a counter-example; a path traversal through the model that shows the reason why the 
property failed. The counter-example is used to animate the CCM {4}, so as to simulate the behavior 
revealed in the counter-example. Thus, the CCM serves as both an input interface to create the NuSMV 
script, and as a simulation display to help stakeholders interpret the resulting counter-examples. 
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(Property is Not Satisfied)
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Figure 21. Overview of model checking 
 
PCA Preliminaries 
An established means of formal verification is model checking, which is illustrated in Figure 20. 
Model checking is a formal method technique used for the verification of embedded systems. Its focus is 
primarily in the verification of hardware, but it has been used to verify software as well. Model checking 
can be used to verify the system-to-be requirements and/or the system’s implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20 shows the key elements in either the explicit or symbolic model checking process. 
Referring to Figure 20, the system model (A) is examined by the model checker algorithm (C), to 
determine whether it satisfies a set of desired propositional temporal properties (B). The properties are 
specified temporal logic which allows for the representation of time, not is absolute terms, but in 
temporal ordering. For example, a temporal specification will specify that a certain system state must 
eventually be reached in the future, and in a certain order compared to another system state.  
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If a property is satisfied, the model checker returns “True” (D), if not satisfied, the model 
checker provides a counter example (E), that is, a path that shows why the property was not satisfied.  
Model checkers are very prone to state explosion, and several approaches, such as BDD, have been 
developed to reduce the number of states in a model while still retaining the behaviors being defined. 
Subsequently, there are various forms of model checking, each trying to manage the problem of state 
explosion, such as partial order reduction [144], bounded model checking [121], and symbolic model 
checking [127]. Among these approaches, symbolic model checking that uses a symbolic model verifier 
(SMV) has been a de facto model checking approach [127].  
There are two major variations of model checkers, explicit and symbolic. In an explicit model 
checker the system is modeled by a type of finite state machine (FSM) known as a Kripke structure.  
A Kripke Structure represents a concurrent system’s behavior as a graph, with each node represents a 
global system state, which is a snapshot of all the system’s concurrent states at any given time. An 
explicit model checker examine one state at a time, performing depth-first traversal of the Kripke from 
state to state. A symbolic model checker can avoid building an entire Kripke, and instead create a 
reduced model, using proportional logic, that captures the system’s behavior, without having to model 
every state variable combination in the system; using a symbolic algorithm, sets of states are examines 
at once. Symbolic checker, such as NuSMV use a rule-based script to capture both the model and the 
temporal properties. 
Explicit model checking is said to be better suited for hardware verification, whereas symbolic 
is considered better fit for verifying software. However, model checking is geared toward using Boolean 
predicates, which can represent some limitation with checking software, that uses a use a wider variety 
of data types. The same can be said about model checking requirements that describe behavior in a non-
Boolean manner. The CCM based approach proposed here will address this issue by translating 
requirements into a Boolean representation that can be symbolically manipulated using propositional 
logic.  
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Temporal quantifiers can then be added to the propositional logic in order to specify temporal 
properties using the same CCM notation. A detailed examination of model checking is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. For our purposes we are only concern with the fact that model checking can be used 
as a form of property checking a set of requirements that has been initial modeled as a CCM. The CCM 
rules maps directly to the IF THEN structure of a symbolic model checking script, such as NuSMV. The 
model checker is treated as a block box, to which we provide the model and temporal properties and the 
model checker confirms whether those properties hold.  
Support Tool Implementation 
The PCA approach was implemented into a support tool, called CCMChecker, allowing us to 
conduct case studies with various sets of requirements. The tool is a Windows application that was 
implemented in Visual C# and uses a third-party graphing library called Graphviz to generate a 
graphical representation of the CCM. Among the various features the tool offers, it enables the entering 
of component--states, generates translation rules, and automatically expands those rules. The tool can 
even display a color-coded Labeled Transition System (LTS) from the expanded rules. The colors 
differentiate the environmental causes (as red transitions) from the system causes (in black). 
Stakeholders can manually simulate the CCM behavior by clicking the environmental causes associated 
with that CCM. Other displays include a LTS that only has the states transitioned by the environmental 
causes and those states transitioned by the system. The tool generates the results of each step in the form 
of an unformatted report.  
The tool is designed in such a way that allows for future expansion and modifications. This is 
achieved by partitioning functionalities into reusable components (objects) and global dedicated data 
structures (structs and lists). The tool’s architecture uses several data structures to contain the data in its 
various forms as it is processed from step to step. These include, but not limited to, separate data 
structures for translation rules, the NuSMV script statements, and the temporal logic properties.  
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The data structures are shared, on a read/write basis, between data processing classes, which are 
also self-contained objects. One such object is the NuSMV script statement generator, which serves as 
an interface to the model checker via the model checker’s script. Thus, another variation of an SMV 
model checker can be used by exchanging the script generator object, for an object that translates the 
CCM rules into the appropriate SMV script language. The tool does not only serve as an entry and 
translator of requirements, but it also executes a third party command line model checker exe, and reads 
its counter-examples via the executable’s standard output stream.  This combined with the changeable 
script generator facilitates the use of various open source model checkers. This makes the tool both an 
implementation to the property checking approach, and a development platform for future approach 
improvements. 
Skid Loader Case Study 
Using CCMChecker, we conducted a study using a real world embedded system, a commercial 
skid loader, to evaluate our approach. In particular, we focused on the method’s ability to expose off-
nominal behaviors of the system, which is the major concern for safety critical systems because off 
nominal behaviors that are not handled properly can result in safety-related accidents.  Figure 21: A 
typical skid loader with the load bucket up (dashed lines) and down (solid line). The safety function in 
question is the automatic disabling of the skid loader bucketBoom when the safety seatBar is lifted. A 
skid loader, shown in Figure 21, is typically usable by anyone without special training or certification. 
Thus, it can potentially be missused. The manufacturer’s objective is to make it as fool-proof as 
possible. In a typical skid loader design, the bucketBoom moves up and down directly in front of the 
cab, creating a potential problem for someone not confined within the cab during the bucket’s use. 
 Figure 21 shows the relative proximity of the bucket’s up/down movement and the operator 
cab. For safety reasons, the driver should be confined within the skid loader cab during the bucket’s 
movement.  
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So, when the driver climbs into the cab, there is a seat-Bar that comes down over the driver, 
similar to the passenger restrain used in roller-coaster. For our case, we do not want the bucketBoom to 
move up or down if the seatBar is up. A seatBar that has been raised could lead to the driver protruding 
part of their body outside the cab, within the bucket’s envelope of movement. This would create a 
potential safety hazard. We analyzed a total of 76 requirements focusing on those requirements that 
pertain to the controlling of the bucket. Of the 76 requirements we found an issue that revolved around 
four requirements; we focus our case study on those four requirements. The portion of the requirements 
1 that pertains to that feature is: 
REQ1: The bucket boom shall move upward when the left pedal is tilt forward with the driver’s toe. 
REQ2: The bucket boom shall move downward when the left pedal is tilt back with the driver’s heel. 
REQ3: The bucket boom shall stop moving when the left pedal is allowed in the default position by the 
driver’s foot. 
REQ4: All bucket boom operations are allowed only if the seat bar is lowered. 
For confidentiality reasons, we have paraphrased the wording of the original requirements that 
were written for the embedded system company while maintaining the intended meaning. Note that in 
the initial set of requirements, REQ4 does state that “All bucket boom operations are allowed only if the 
seat bar is lowered.” This would appear to address the desired safety requirement. However, to the 
stakeholders stating REQ4, there may be certain assumptions based on what they perceive as the 
driver’s normal behavior.  
For example, a typical normal behavior would be that the driver climbs into the cab, lowers the 
seatBar, and then operates the bucket. Upon existing, the driver would then stop operating the bucket 
(placing it in a down position), and then raise the seatBar when he is departing the cab. The following 
subsections describe how our approach is applied to the skid loader’s requirements and detects possible 
safety-critical defects. The safety function in question is the automatic disabling of the skid loader 
bucketBoom when the safety seatBar is lifted.  
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Figure 22. A typical skid loader with the load bucket up 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Creating the CCM 
To create the CCM, and subsequent NuSMV script, a user must enact the four steps used to 
construct a CCM. We explain how these steps are applied to the skid loader’s requirements. 
Step 1: Elicit a set of system Components (C), as expressed in the requirements. From the set of 
requirements above, we can readily identify three components: bucketBoom, seatBar, and leftPedal, 
which we have abbreviated. Note that, in this case, the three components are quickly identified because 
they are system artifacts that are either controlled by the system, or provide an interface to the driver. 
Three components will produce a CCM with three STDs. One advantage to our method is the ability to 
model the interactions between the components we wish to focus on, without having to model the entire 
system; this results in a compositional approach [15]. In this case, we are focusing on the interaction 
between the bucketBoom and the seatBar, so we can either model the  leftPedal as a third STD or treat it 
as part of a transition. Having the option to abstract additional STDs as part of a transition helps manage 
the complexity and size of the resulting CCM. For our purposes, we will only model the bucketBoom 
and the seatBar. 
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Step 2: Elicit a set of Component(States)) as expressed in the requirements. Next, CCM creation 
requires that we assess what possible states the two components will be in at various times during the 
desired system operation. This gives us the following list of component states: seatBar(up), 
seatBar(down), bucketBoom(notMoving), bucketBoom (movingUpward), and 
bucketBoom(movingDownward). 
Step 3: Elicit a set of inter-component Transitions (T), forming a State Transition Diagram 
(STD) for each component as expressed in the requirements. Having determined the required 
Component(State)s, we will now establish the inter-component transitions to build a STD for each 
component as expressed in the requirements. We can start with the seatBar, which only has two possible 
states (up or down), and consequently two possible transitions (T1 and T2). Using the CCM translation 
rule notation we construct the following two expressions from REQ4: 
T1: seatBar(down)  seatBar(up) 
T2: seatBar(up)  seatBar(down) 
We can do the same with the bucketBoom, which three states and 
six possible transitions (T3 - T8) between them: 
T3: bucketBoom(notMoving)  bucketBoom(movingUpward) 
T4: bucketBoom(movingUpward)  bucketBoom(notMoving) 
T5: bucketBoom(notMoving)  bucketBoom(movingDownward) 
T6: bucketBoom(movingDownward)  bucketBoom(notMoving) 
T7: bucketBoom(movingDownward)  bucketBoom(movingUpward) 
T8: bucketBoom(movingUpward)  bucketBoom(movingDownward) 
 
 
 
 
 79 
Step 4: Elicit a set of Causal Relationships. The final step is for the stakeholders to establish the 
casual relationships between the different component STDs. The seatBar transition function is defined 
solely by the driver’s act of raising or lowering the seatBar. Thus, we have: 
[1] DRIVER(raisesSeatBar) : seatBar(down) seatBar(up) 
[2] DRIVER(lowersSeatBar) : seatBar(up)  seatBar(down) 
According to the requirements, the bucketBoom’s behavior is controlled by two components, 
the liftPedal and the seatBar. We decided earlier to only represent the seatBar’s STD in the CCM, and 
specify the liftPedal’s causal relation to bucketBoom within the bucketBoom’s transition functions. 
Thus, we obtain the following expressions for the bucketBoom: 
[3] DRIVER(tiltLPForward) ^ seatBar(down) :  
bucketBoom(notMoving)  bucketBoom(movingUpward) 
[4] DRIVER(LPDefault) : bucketBoom(movingUpward) 
 bucketBoom(notMoving) 
[5] DRIVER(tiltLPBack) ^ seatBar(down) : 
bucketBoom(notMoving)  bucketBoom(movingDownward) 
[6] DRIVER(LPDefault) : bucketBoom(movingDownward) 
 bucketBoom(notMoving) 
[7] DRIVER(tiltLPForward) ^ seatBar(down) : 
bucketBoom(movingDownward)  bucketBoom(movingUpward) 
[8] DRIVER(tiltLPBack) ^ seatBar(down) : 
bucketBoom(movingUpward)  bucketBoom(movingDownward) 
Figure 23 shows the CCM model derived from the requirements by following the four steps. 
Note that the transitions for the bucketBoom incorporate the behavior of the DRIVER as well as that of 
the seatBar.  
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bucketBoom(movingUpward)bucketBoom(movingDownward)
[DRIVER(tiltLPForward) ^ seatBar(down)] 
[(DRIVER(tiltLPBack) ^ seatBar(down))] 
bucketBoom(notMoving)
[DRIVER(LPDefault)] 
[DRIVER(LPDefault)] 
seatBar(down) seatBar(up)
[DRIVER(lowersSeatBar)] 
[DRIVER(raisesSeatBar)] 
[DRIVER(tiltLPForward) ^ seatBar(down)] [DRIVER(tiltLPBack) ^ seatBar(down))] 
 
Figure 23. The partial CCM of the Skid Loader 
 
The DRIVER is written in uppercase because it is considered a transition from the system’s 
operating environment; a cause that originates external to the system. As to the seatBar’s transitions, 
they are solely external, since their direct cause is the DRIVER; the CCM we have specified is heavily 
affected by external actions to the system. The DRIVER is a direct cause of behavior in both the bucket-
Boom and the seatBar.  
This means that there are potentially many ways in which the DRIVER can cause an unexpected 
(off-nominal) behavior in the system. With the nominal behavior in mind, the most intuitive way to 
model REQ4 (Figure 22) would be by forming a logical conjunction of  the seatBar component state 
with the bucketBoom, which enables the bucketBoom to move only when the seatBar is down. 
However, the real question is whether there is off-nominal behavior by the driver that would defeat the 
desired safety feature. In other words, can the DRIVER somehow create a scenario in which the bucket-
Boom is moving while the seatBar is up?  
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MODULE main
VAR
   bucketBoom : {movDown, movUp, notMov};        
   seatBar: {down, up};      
   driver : {tiltLPBack, tiltLPForw, lpDefault, raiseSeatBar, lowSeatBar};
ASSIGN
init(seatBar) := up;
init(bucketBoom) := notMov;
ASSIGN
next(seatBar) := case
seatBar = up & driver = lowSeatBar : down;
seatBar = down & driver = raiseSeatBar : up;
TRUE:seatBar;
esac;
ASSIGN
next(bucketBoom) := case
--One
bucketBoom = movDown & (seatBar = down & driver = tiltLPForw) : movUp;
bucketBoom = movUp & (seatBar = down & driver = tiltLPBack) : movDown;
--Two
bucketBoom = notMov & (driver = tiltLPBack & seatBar = down) : movDown;
bucketBoom = movDown & driver = lpDefault : notMov;
--Three
bucketBoom = notMov & (driver = tiltLPForw & seatBar = down) : movUp;
bucketBoom = movUp & driver = lpDefault : notMov;
TRUE:bucketBoom;
esac;  
 
Creating the NuSMV Script 
The CCM is used as a stakeholder friendly front-end to a NuSMV model checker. This requires 
the CCM’s translation into the script notation used in NuSMV. To achieve this we use a mapping 
algorithm that leverages the fact that both CCM and NuSMV notations have an IF-THEN structure. 
Another similarity is that both CCM and NuSMV notations represents components, present states, next 
states and transitions. Thus, both share similar artifacts and semantics, while expressing those semantics 
using different syntax. Figure 24 shows a typical NuSMV script. Note that Figure 24 is a partial listing 
of the complete script. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24. An example of partial NuSMV script 
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Note that the ASSIGN sections of Figure 24 use an IF-THEN structure to describe a 
component’s behavior. For example, The statement, seatBar = up & driver = lowSeatBar : down, reads 
IF seatBar is up and the driver lowers the seatBar, THEN the seatBar will transit to a down state. 
Expressed in CCM notation, the same behavior is written as: driver(lowSeatBar) : seatBar(up) ! 
seatBar(down). In the general form, T : C(S1)  C(S2), Transition (T) can be a disjunctive and/or 
conjunctive expression of component states. In general terms, given a set of CCM expressions, the form 
is shown in line (1): 
(1) Cn(S2) : Cp(S1)  Cp(S2),  
Where Cn and Cp are different components, and Cp transitions from states S1 to S2 as caused 
by Cn being in state S2. The algorithm used to create the ASSIGN sections iterates through each CCM 
expression, performing the following steps: 
Convert Cp(S1) to Cp = (S1) 
Convert Cp(S2) to : S2; 
Convert Cn(S2) to Cn = S2 
Convert Cp(S1) to nextCp 
Convert Cp(S1) to 1 : Cp 
Concatenate ASSIGN, nextCp, := case, Cp = (S1), &, Cn = 
S2, : S2;, 1:Cp, and esac; 
The concatenated terms form the ASSIGN section (2): 
(2) ASSIGN 
next(Cp) := case 
Cp = S1&Cn = S2 : S2; 
1:Cp; 
esac; 
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The VAR section of the NuSMV script is created using a similar parse-convert-concatenate 
algorithm resulting in the two CCM expressions (3) and (4) translated into the VAR section starting at 
(5). 
(3) Cn(S2) : Cm(S1)  Cm(S2) 
(4) Cp(S1) : Cn(S1)  Cn(S2) 
(5) VAR 
Cm : fS1; S2g; 
Cn : fS1; S2g; 
 Creating the NuSMV Temporal Properties  
It is not sufficient to convert the CCM into the model portion of the NuSMV script. To complete 
the NuSMV script, we still need to specify the temporal logic properties that will be used to expose any 
off-nominal scenarios that may be produced in the CCM. While the creation of temporal logic properties 
is traditionally the most knowledge intensive endeavor in model checking, we will facilitate the 
automatic creation of the properties by leveraging two areas of research that has been conducted in the 
pass. The first is the development of temporal logic patterns as a means to simplify the specification 
process [130, 136]. The second area of research, which directly relates to the first area, is the fact that 
the most useful temporal properties can be achieved with a handful of patterns [130, 131]. For our 
purposes, we have leveraged this prior research to achieve the desired defect coverage with the 
following four temporal logic patterns (written in the NuSMV script language). 
A: AG(!(Cn = S1)  EF(Cn = S1)) 
B: AG((Cn = S1)  EF(!(Cn = S1))) 
C: AG(!(Cn = c(s)1 & Cm = c(s)2)  EF(Cn = c(s)1 & Cm = c(s)2)) 
D: !EF(Cn = c(s)1 & Cm = c(s)1) 
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In each pattern, Cn represents component, and Sn is that component’s state. For example, C1 = 
S1 means State number 1 of component number 1. Patterns A and B are used to expose incompleteness 
in the CCM, which would translate into an undesirable behavior in the system. Pattern A verifies 
whether a given component(state) can be entered. This is a measure of the state’s in-degree, of which 
there should be at least one in-degree per component(state). Pattern B verifies whether a given 
component(state) can be exited. This is a measure of the state’s out-degree, of which there should be at 
least one per component(state). Together, patterns A and B verify whether a round-trip traversal is 
possible in a given component’s STD. Embedded systems typically do not terminate, while running, and 
are in a given state at any given time. Thus, every component(state) in the CCM should have at least one 
in-degree and one out-degree. Patterns A and B are generated automatically for each component(state) 
by the tool. Pattern C also verifies round-trip traversal but on a system level. In this case, the question is 
whether the initial system state can be reentered. The component(states) that comprise the initial system 
state is selected by the user, while the temporal property is created by the tool. PatternD, is the strongest 
property used to exposed off nominal behavior. It determines whether an undesired system state is 
eventually reachable or not.  
The component(states) that comprise the undesired system state is selected by the user, while 
the temporal property is created by the tool. Referring back to listing one, we see one example of a 
temporal logic property, in the SPEC (last line) section of the script: !EF(seatBar = up& bucketBoom = 
movUp). Note that this property uses pattern D, which determines whether an unsafe system state is 
eventually reachable or not. To create the temporal properties the support tool uses a mapping algorithm 
similar to the one used for the script model. We now turn to a case study, derived from the design of a 
real world skid loader presently available on the market. The Skid Loader’s manufacturer will be kept 
confidential. In particular, we focused on the method’s ability to expose off-nominal behaviors of the 
system, which is the major concern for safety critical systems because off nominal behaviors that are not 
handled properly can result in safety related accidents. The CCM of Figure 23, is automatically 
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converted into the model portion of the NuSMV script as shown in Figure 24. The temporal logic 
properties are also generated, and placed in the NuSMV script. The followings are the properties 
generated for the skid loader example: !EF(seatBar = up&bucketBoom = movUp) : This verifies that an 
undesired system state cannot occur. It is using pattern D as listed in Section 6.4 
AG(!(seatBar = up&bucketBoom = notMov) 
! EF(seatBar = up&bucketBoom = notMov))  
This verifies that you can always get back to initial states. It is using pattern C as listed in Figure 
19. The following properties verify that there is at least one in-degree for each of the seatBar states. 
Similar in-degree properties using the same pattern below were created for the bucketBoom (not 
shown). They are using pattern A as listed in Figure 19. 
AG(!(seatBar = up) ! EF(seatBar = up)) 
AG(!(seatBar = down) ! EF(seatBar = down)) 
The following properties verify that there is at least one out-degree for each of the seatBar 
states. Similar out-degree properties using the same pattern below were created for the bucketBoom (not 
shown). They are using pattern B as listed in Figure 19. 
AG((seatBar = up) ! EF(!(seatBar = up))) 
AG((seatBar = down) ! EF(!(seatBar = down))) 
SPEC --Verifying that an undesired system state cannot occur 
   !EF(seatBar = up & bucketBoom = movUp) 
SPEC --Verifying that you can always get back to initial states (Completeness) 
   AG(!(seatBar = up & bucketBoom = notMov) -> EF(seatBar = up & bucketBoom = notMov)) 
SPEC --Verifying that you can always exit the initial states (Completeness) 
   AG((seatBar = up & bucketBoom = notMov) -> EF(!(seatBar = up & bucketBoom = 
notMov))) 
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SPEC --Verify that there is at least one indegree (Completeness) 
   AG(!(seatBar = up) -> EF(seatBar = up)) 
SPEC --Verify that there is at least one outdegree (Completeness) 
   AG((seatBar = up) -> EF(!(seatBar = up))) 
SPEC --Verify that in B(1):A(1)->A(2), B(1) precedes A(2) 
   !E[!(seatBar = down) U (bucketBoom = movUp & !(seatBar = down))] 
Model Checking Results 
After the model and temporal properties are combined into a NuSMV script, the script is 
executed by a NuSMV command line executable. The standard out is read from the executable, and any 
and all counter-examples that represent a property that did not hold is parsed out. The counter example 
can then be represented as either a traversal path consisting of only those states and transitions that lead 
up to the undesired state, or as a sequence of CCM simulation snapshots, where each snapshot highlights 
a system state. Both representations will be demonstrated later in this section. Figure 24 shows the 
results of running the skid loader NuSMV script through the model checker; only the single resulting 
counter example is shown, using a traversal path representation. The requirements as stated will result in 
an undesired system state, that of the seatBar being up, while the bucketBoom is moving. Furthermore, 
the model checker was able to reveal this because the NuSMV script did not purposely assign any rules 
or initial values to the DRIVER component states. This allowed for an unconstrained enactment of the 
DRIVER’s behavior upon the model. Subsequently, all possible behavioral combinations by the 
DRIVER were simulated. This includes any off-nominal behaviors that stakeholders may have assume 
the driver would never enact under normal operation of the skid loader.  
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Figure 25. Counterexample from first run through model checker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this case, from the counter-example, we see that the undesired system state is reached when 
the driver decides to lift the seatBar while the bucketBoom is in motion; a trivial action on the driver’s 
but one that was unaccounted for in the requirements. REQ4 says: “All bucket boom operations are 
allowed only if the seatBar is lowered.” This requirement is satisfied in the case where the bucket- 
Boom is not allowed to move until the seatBar is lowered, but no requirement covers the scenario where 
the seatBar is raised, once the bucketBoom is moving. This is an example of a “trivial” yet potentially 
dangerous oversight on the part of stakeholders. In response to the exposed missing requirement, we 
could make the adjustment shown in Figure 25.  
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bucketBoom(movingUpward)bucketBoom(movingDownward)
[DRIVER(tiltLPForward) ^ seatBar(down)] 
[(DRIVER(tiltLPBack) ^ seatBar(down))] 
bucketBoom(notMoving)
[DRIVER(LPDefault)] [DRIVER(LPDefault)] 
seatBar(down) seatBar(up)
[DRIVER(lowersSeatBar)] 
[DRIVER(raisesSeatBar) ^ seatBarLock(off)] 
[DRIVER(tiltLPForward) ^ seatBar(down)] [DRIVER(tiltLPBack) ^ seatBar(down))] 
seatBarLock(off) seatBarLock(on)
[bucketBoom(notMov)] 
[seatBar(down)] 
 
Figure 26. The modified CCM in response to the counterexample of Figure 24 
 
 
 
 
Since the undesired state occurs as a result of the driver’s unconstrained behavior with the 
seatBar, we have added a seatBar lock in order to constraint the seatBar and limit the results of driver’s 
behavior. The addition of the seatBar lock represents one or more requirements that were missing and 
could have sooner or later been elicited or conceived in order to address the unconstrained behavior of 
the driver. If not caught during the requirements phase, this issue would have likely been caught down-
stream during the system’s development at a higher cost.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, using our approach, it would have likely been caught very quickly, as the 
requirements are elicited, since CCMChecker allows for continuous simulation of the requirements, on 
an incremental basis.  
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The additional requirements describing the seatBar lock could be worded and added to the set of 
requirements at the stakeholder’s discretion. Also, the wording can be taken directly from the CCM by 
explicitly describing the STD pertaining to the added seatBar lock. For example, additional requirements 
could be expressed as “REQ5: If the seatBarLock is off, and the seatBar is pulled down, the seat- 
BarLock shall activate,” and “REQ6: If the seat bar is down, it can only be raised up, if the driver tries to 
raises the seatbar and the seatBarLock is off.” Notice that the wording is taken from the modified CCM 
in Figure 25.  
This new CCM was automatically described in a new NuSMV script, run again in the NuSMV 
executable, and produced the result as shown in Figure 26. The new counter example in Figure 10 shows 
that the addition of a seatBarLock requirement was not enough to avoid the undesired system state. To 
obtain a better understanding of how to address the remaining problem, we analyzed the new counter-
example, using two sequence snapshots from the CCM simulations enacted by approach. Figure 27 
shows the succession of two CCM snapshots leading up to the undesired state of the seatBar being up 
while the bucketBoom is moving. The two snapshots in Figure 27 are created by the approach, as it runs 
a simulation of the counter-example using the same CCM diagram generated during elicitation. 
Generating a CCM-based simulation helps the stakeholders interpret the counter-example produced by 
the Model Checker.  
The two CCM snapshots in Figure 27 are labeled “State 1.5” (top) and “State 1.6” (bottom), 
which corresponds to the same two states of the counter example in Figure 26. Starting from the top of 
Figure 27, the states with the bold line represent the states the three components are in during State 1.5. 
The transitions in bold will allow a state transition on the next clock cycle, resulting in State 1.6.  
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In State 1.5 of Figure 27, the system is poised for the bucketBoom to start moving upward, and 
the seatBarLock to unlock during the next transition cycle. With the bucketBoom moving and the 
seatBar unlock (State 1.6), there is nothing to prevent the unsafe condition if the driver decides to lift up 
the seatBar. Therefore, the only apparent solution is to further constraint how State 1.6 occurs, by 
enabling the seatBar to unlock solely on the basis of a non-moving bucketBoom. By examining the 
transitions in bold in State 1.5 of Figure 27, the stakeholders might decide that it is a bad idea to allow 
the unlocking of the seatBarLock only when the bucketBoom is not moving. Therefore, they may try 
placing a further restriction on how the seatBar is unlocked. One additional restriction would be to 
logically AND the driver’s attempt to raise the seatBar (driver (raiseSeatBar)), with 
bucketBoom(notMov), which would be the only safe bucketBoom state for the driver to raise the 
seatBar. We see this modification in Figure 28. While it may not be obvious that this additional 
 
State: 1.1 (bucketBoom = notMov, seatBar = up, seatBarLock = off)
State: 1.2 (bucketBoom = notMov, seatBar = up, seatBarLock = off)
[driver = tiltLPBack] 
State: 1.3 (bucketBoom = notMov, seatBar = down, seatBarLock = off)
[driver = lowSeatBar] 
State: 1.4 (bucketBoom = movDown, seatBar = down, seatBarLock = on)
[driver = tiltLPBack] 
State: 1.5 (bucketBoom = notMov, seatBar = down, seatBarLock = on)
[driver = lpDefault] 
State: 1.6 (bucketBoom = movUp, seatBar = down, seatBarLock = off)
[driver = tiltLpForw] 
State: 1.6 (bucketBoom = movUp, seatBar = up, seatBarLock = on)
[driver = raiseSeatBar] 
 
Figure 27. Counterexample from running the first corrected set of requirements 
 
 91 
bucketBoom(movingUpward)bucketBoom(movingDownward)
[DRIVER(tiltLPForward) 
^ seatBar(down)] 
[(DRIVER(tiltLPBack) 
^ seatBar(down))] 
bucketBoom(notMoving)
[DRIVER(LPDefault)] 
[DRIVER(LPDefault)] 
seatBar(down) seatBar(up)
[DRIVER(lowersSeatBar)] 
[DRIVER(raisesSeatBar) 
^ seatBarLock(off)] 
[DRIVER(tiltLPForward) 
^ seatBar(down)] 
[DRIVER(tiltLPBack) 
^ seatBar(down))] 
seatBarLock(off) seatBarLock(on)
[bucketBoom(notMov)] 
[seatBar(down)] 
bucketBoom(movingUpward)bucketBoom(movingDownward)
[DRIVER(tiltLPForward) 
^ seatBar(down)] 
[(DRIVER(tiltLPBack) 
^ seatBar(down))] 
bucketBoom(notMoving)
[DRIVER(LPDefault)] 
[DRIVER(LPDefault)] 
seatBar(down) seatBar(up)
[DRIVER(lowersSeatBar)] 
[DRIVER(raisesSeatBar) 
^ seatBarLock(off)] 
[DRIVER(tiltLPForward) 
^ seatBar(down)] 
[DRIVER(tiltLPBack) 
^ seatBar(down))] 
seatBarLock(off) seatBarLock(on)
[bucketBoom(notMov)] 
[seatBar(down)] 
State 1.5
State 1.6
 
Figure 28. Two snapshots in CCM-based counterexample simulation 
 
restriction would finally solve the problem, the fact is that CCMChecker’s model checker will take very 
little time to verify whether it is indeed a solution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As it turns out is, when running the model checker on the CCM in Figure 28, all properties hold 
(they all return true). The additional seatBarLock and associated restrictions, can be expressed as 
additional requirements at the stakeholders discretion.  
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bucketBoom(movingUpward)bucketBoom(movingDownward)
[DRIVER(tiltLPForward) ^ seatBar(down)] 
[(DRIVER(tiltLPBack) ^ seatBar(down))] 
bucketBoom(notMoving)
[DRIVER(LPDefault)] [DRIVER(LPDefault)] 
seatBar(down) seatBar(up)
[DRIVER(lowersSeatBar)] 
[DRIVER(raisesSeatBar) ^ seatBarLock(off)] 
[DRIVER(tiltLPForward) ^ seatBar(down)] [DRIVER(tiltLPBack) ^ seatBar(down))] 
seatBarLock(off) seatBarLock(on)
[driver(raiseSeatBar) ^ bucketBoom(notMov)] 
[seatBar(down)] 
 
Figure 29. Additional restriction is placed on the unlocking of the seatBarLock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion and Limitations of  PCA 
The skid loader case study stresses some important observations about the proposed method. To 
add an exposed missing requirement, the stakeholders can suggest a solution, based on how they have 
assessed the problem, and the method/tool provides feedback on the solution’s success. This greatly 
accelerates the process of finding missing requirements that address off-nominal scenarios. Of course, 
for the sake of space, we have only specified one undesired system state. In an actual elicitation 
process, more than one undesired state could be entered, increasing the chances of catching any further 
problems that may have been produced by using the final solution in this study.  
We are encouraged by the results and plan on applying the technique to a greater set of 
requirements, particularly where the system is intended to interact with a high percentage of external 
stimuli, up and beyond that of merely user interaction. This would include sensor data, and interrupts. 
While our focus has been on exposing off-nominal behaviors, we think that other anomalies can be 
potentially exposed as well, such as inconsistency between concurrent processes, and possible deadlock 
and starvation scenarios. Some of the remaining questions 
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pertaining to our approach, include the question of scalability. CCM’s ability to focus on the interaction 
between a subset of a system’s components allows for the analysis of subsystems. This in turn, enables 
us to divide and conquer the system in such a way that modeling a complete system may not be 
necessary in most cases. Partial modeling would keep the number of states manageable. 
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CCM STATE PROFILING APPROACH (SPA) 
In embedded systems where there are considerable interactions with the system’s operating 
environment, it is not unusual for the environment to behave in a manner unaccounted for by the system 
specification. Of particular concern are those interactions that come from the system’s human operators. 
Human behavior can be unpredictable and off-nominal, contrary to what the designers of a system 
consider normal behavior for the operator. Stakeholders typically make assumptions when specifying a 
set of system requirements. Key to these assumptions is the way in which the system and its operating 
environment are intended to behave; these intended behaviors are treated as nominal. Quite often, 
unintended, unusual behaviors are not accounted for; therefore,  not every contingency the system might 
have to address is included in the requirements [138]. We refer to these unintended behaviors as Off-
Nominal Behaviors (ONBs) [10, 151]. ONBs can produced in an undesired system state, which can 
result in a safety hazard or damage to the equipment being controlled. At the heart of our research and 
subsequent approach is the question: What undesired states can the system’s operating environment 
cause, due to lack of explicitness in the requirements? Or what have the stakeholders miss from not 
stating things clearly enough? We want to address these questions in a way that allows non-technical 
stakeholders, particularly domain expects, to participate in addressing the ONB problem. 
Even a simple set of requirements can result in a system that contains more susceptibility to 
ONBs than anticipated, primarily due to requirement ambiguities. To illustrate this claim, consider the 
following simple requirement: A system shall consist of a push-button switch and a motor. When an 
operator presses the switch, the motor shall be turned on, and it shall stay on for 3 seconds before 
automatically turning off. These requirements assume that the human operator will press the switch, 
wait for the motor to start, and then immediately release the switch. The system will then start counting 
the seconds and will turn the motor off after 3 seconds. The system’s correct operation assumes that the 
operator behaves in the way implied by the requirements; this action is considered the operator’s 
nominal behavior.  
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However, what if the operator releases the switch before the motor starts or decides to turn the 
motor off before the 3 seconds expire? How will the system react to an operator who acts in an off 
normal manner? Will the system be placed in an undesired state from which it cannot recover? Is the 
system specified with enough contingencies to avoid an undesired state from an operator or from the 
environment in general? Our experience with embedded requirements suggests an increase in potential 
ONB-induced undesired states with an increase in requirement ambiguities. 
To date, some researchers have tried to address the ONB problem [147, 148, 149, 133], but most 
attempts to resolve this problem have focused on how the human operator reacts to off-nominal 
situations within the operating environment [151]. Our approach addresses the ONB problem from the 
system’s perspective by exposing any undesired states unintentionally produced by the requirements. 
We use a stakeholder-friendly modeling approach that we developed called the Causal Component 
Model (CCM) and algorithmically model all possible transition paths in the system model. These paths 
represent both intended and unintended system behaviors in response to the operating environment. We 
then determine whether non-recoverable undesired states can be reached, and if so, our approach 
determines which ONB results in that state. 
Overview 
Our approach operates on the premise that ambiguities in a set of requirements can allow ONBs 
to result in a non-recoverable, undesired system state. “Undesirable” means a system state that should be 
avoided while “non-recoverable” means that the system cannot exit that state automatically; both 
“undesired” and “non-recoverable” are necessary terms in our definition. For example, in a microwave 
oven, an undesired state would be the oven cooking while the door is open. We will designate that 
situation as {Oven(cooking), Door(open)}, where both Oven and Door are components of the 
microwave oven system. However, we simply cannot avoid all occurrences of {Oven(cooking), 
Door(open)}.  
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Figure 30. Overview of CCM state profiling approach 
 
 
 
 
We want the microwave oven to detect when {Oven(cooking), Door(open)} occurs because 
there is typically nothing to keep a person from opening the door while something is cooking. Therefore, 
an undesired state is tolerable if the system is specified to recover from it. (In this case, when 
{Oven(cooking), Door(open)} occurs, the oven should automatically be turned off.) However, if 
{Oven(cooking), Door(open)} occurs and no means to recover from it has been specified, then 
{Oven(cooking), Door(open)} becomes a non-recoverable, undesired state that must be avoided. Our 
approach would determine if an undesired state can occur and if it is non-recoverable, and then indicate 
what environmental action caused its occurrence. We now describe, in detail, the major steps involved 
with the CCM state profiling approach as expressed in Figure 30. The squares in Figure 30 refer to the 
artifacts produced while the numbered ovals describe the processes producing the artifacts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The green squares show input artifacts; the red square is the final output for the process. The 
following list is written to correspond with each oval. 
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1) Natural Language (NL) Translated into Rules: NL requirements for an embedded system are 
translated into a set of translation rules that can be modeled as a CCM. The translation is achieved by 
using the four-step CCM creation process. A translation rule specifies the transition between two given 
system states and is expressed in  the form of the  mapping function: Transition_Cause   : Present_State 
 Next_State. The Transition_Cause can be directly induced by the system’s operating environment or 
by the system itself. At this stage, not every possible system state is accounted for by the translation 
rules because not all states are explicitly expressed in the requirements, thus we perform the next step.  
2) Expand Translation Rules: To account for every possible system state, we must expand the 
translation rules to a set of explicit rules that define the transitions between as many system states within 
the system’s entire state space as possible. Expanding the rules accounts for all transitions that are both 
explicitly stated and implied by the requirements. 
3) Isolate Rules with Undesired Next States: Each rule specifies a transition from a given 
present state to the next state. Using a set of stakeholder-defined, undesired states, we determine which 
rules transition into the next state that is also a user-defined, undesired state and then create a set of these 
rules. 
      4) Profile Undesired Next States: Typically, but not always, a rule’s next state is matched to the 
present state of another rule, making that next state recoverable by another rule. “State profiling”  
determines  if a state is recoverable by a rule specifying a Transition_Cause by the system. If so, we call 
that next state “system recoverable.” In this step, we are looking for undesired next states that are non-
recoverable by the system. Such an undesired state can be a safety hazard, or it can cause the system to 
lock up. A rule with an undesired, non-recoverable next state is called an “undesired rule.” 
      5) Isolate Undesired Rules with Different End States: We define “end states” as a rule’s present 
and next states. If a given rule has end states that are both undesired, then we ignore that rule because 
the transition into an undesired state does not originate with that rule.  
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If a rule has an acceptable present state and an undesired next state, then that rule is considered the cause 
of an undesired state; the rule is isolated for further analysis. We focus on isolating rules that specify an 
environmental cause because we are interested in how an ONB from the environment can cause an 
undesired state.  
      6) Stakeholders Address ONB Problem: From the final set of undesired rules, we create a list 
describing which environmental causes result in an undesired state from a given acceptable state. 
Knowing how the environment causes a transition from an acceptable state to an undesired state helps 
the stakeholder determine how to address the potential ONB. 
 SPA Preliminaries 
In our approach, we utilize the concept of a component. A component is part of a system’s 
composition that can change states and/or cause a change in state. For example, in a microwave oven 
system, the components can consist of {startButton, ovenDoor, cookTimer}. Note that a potential 
subsystem, such as the cookTimer, can also be considered a component. It is up to the stakeholders to 
determine how they want to decompose a system into components, meaning that different abstraction 
levels can be modeled. We assign states to components and refer to them as component--states. We 
combine component--states to form (global) system states.  
 These system states are mapped to one another using rules, derived from the requirements, 
which define the cause of  the transition between two given system states. Finally, there is the goal of 
exposing non-recoverable, undesired system states and the off-nominal behaviors that may cause them. 
We now formally define these concepts and operations. An example of these concepts and operations 
follows.  
The Expanded Rules Algorithm 
The expanded rules are the explicit rules derived from the ECR and SCR translation rules. We 
expand the translation rules to eliminate the zeroes, resulting in each possible interpretation for the 
translation rules.  
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Figure 31. System state with labeled in/out degrees 
The algorithm begins by generating the system’s entire state space. Let CSn be a set of 
component--states for a given component and CARD = {│CS1│,  │CS2│, . . . , │CSn│} be the set of 
each component--state’s cardinality. The system state space, SSP, is the Cartesian product SSP = CARD 
x CARD. We can parse the digits of a numerical system state into a set of component--states as shown 
in this example: 2.0.1 ≡ {cs1, cs2, cs3},  where cs1 = 2, cs2 = 0, cs3 = 1. Similarly, we numerically 
represent and parse the state-space members into the form {ss1, ss2, . . ., ssn}. We expand the translation 
rules by applying the following algorithm to the translation rules. 
1. FOR EACH ordered pair  ‹csn, ssn›  derived from {cs1, cs2, . . . , csn} x {ss1, ss2, . . . . , ssn} 
2.      IF csn = ssn, THEN csn → csn, and we compare the next digit at n + 1.  
3.      IF csn ≠ ssn, THEN we stop comparing digits and go to the next member of SSP.  
4.      IF (csn = 0    ssn ≠ 0), THEN ssn → csn, and we compare the next digit at n + 1. 
The algorithm stops when all the ordered pairs, ‹csn, ssn›, have been processed. The expanded 
rules are contained in two separate sets based on whether the rule causes are from the environmental or 
the system. 
The State Profiling Algorithm  
State profiling is used to determine the number of in-degrees (ID) and out-degrees (OD) for a 
given system state. Figure 30 shows a given state with its in/out-degrees. 
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The degrees are further designated by the type of transition cause, for which there are two: a 
system cause (T) and an environmental (E) cause. “TID” is the set of all in-degrees caused by the 
system, “EID” is the set of all in-degrees caused by the environment, “TOD” is the set of all out-degrees 
caused by the system, and “EOD” is the set of all out-degrees caused by the environment. We use the set 
cardinality symbol, “|  |”, to indicate the number of in/out-degrees for a given set. For example, |TOD| = 
0 means that there are no system out-degrees. State profiling establishes a cardinal number for each set 
which, in turn, indicates how that given state is transitioned by either the system or the environment.  
A key question is whether a state is system recoverable. We want to isolate states that are non-
recoverable by the system, which translates into states with |TOD| = 0. The first step in state profiling is 
to determine the cardinal number for each of the four degree sets: EID, TID, EOD, and TOD. The state-- 
profiling algorithm compares every system state with the present and next state of each rule to determine 
the number of in-degrees and out-degrees according to the type of rule (environmental cause or system 
cause). State-profiling is achieved with the following algorithm. 
1. LET |EID| = 0, |EOD| = 0 
2. LET |TID| = 0, |TOD| =0 
3. LET EC be the set of all rules: ec : sep  sen, that have an environmental cause. 
4. LET TC be the set of all rules: tc : stp  stn that have a transition cause. 
5. LET S be the set of all system states, s 
6. FOR EACH system state, sS 
7.      COMPARE s to each rule state {sep, sen, stp, stn} 
8.      IF s ≡ sep, THEN increment |EOD| by 1 
9.      IF s ≡ sen, THEN increment |EID| by 1 
10.      IF s ≡ stp, THEN increment |TOD| by 1 
11.      IF s ≡ stn, THEN |increment |TID| by 1 
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We use the following convention to represent a state’s profile: State {|EOD|, |EID|, |TOD|, 
|TID|}. For example, if state 1.2.1. has |EOD| = 1, |EID| = 2, |TOD| = 1, and |TID| = 3, we write 1.2.1.{1, 
2, 1, 3}. Due to requirement ambiguities, even a simple set of requirements can result in a system that 
contains more susceptibility to ONBs than anticipated. To illustrate this claim, we will use the following 
simple requirements and define one undesired state:  
REQ1: A system shall consist of a push-button switch, a motor, and a temperature sensor.  
REQ2: The motor shall be turned on and off when an operator presses the switch on and off, 
respectively. 
REQ3: The motor shall be allowed to turn on if the temperature is below 80 but not when overheated 
(i.e., above 100 degrees). 
UNDESIRED STATE: It is any system state when the motor is on while overheated. 
NOTE that this example is similar to the prior motor controller, except this time we have 
purposely seeded the requirements with a defect. We will apply the process outlined in Figure 1 to the 
requirements we just stated. For clarity, we will used the same process headinECR labeled in Figure 1. 
       1) Rules Creation: Our approach begins with translating the requirements into translation rules. 
Translation is performed using a four-step process:  
Step 1: Determine components:  
{Switch, Temp_Sensor, Motor} 
Step 2: Determine component--states:  
{Switch(off), Switch(on), Temp_Sensor(safe), Temp_Sensor(overheated), Motor(off), 
Motor(on)} 
Step 3: Determine component--state transitions: 
Switch(off)  Switch(on) 
Switch(on)  Switch(off) 
Temp_Sensor(safe)  Temp_Sensor(overheated) 
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Figure 32. A Causal Component Model, of the requirements 
Temp_Sensor(overheated)  Temp_Sensor(safe) 
Motor(off)  Motor(on) 
Motor(on)  Motor(off) 
Step 4: Determine transition causes (resulting in the following translation rules, 1 to 6): 
[1] USER(press) : Switch(off)  Switch(on) 
[2] USER(releases) : Switch(on)  Switch(off) 
[3] TEMP(>100) : Temp_Sensor(safe)  Temp_Sensor(overheated) 
[4] TEMP(<80) : Temp_Sensor(overheated)  Temp_Sensor(safe) 
[5] Switch(on)   Temp_Sensor(safe) : Motor(off)  Motor(on)  
[6] Switch(off) : Motor(on)  Motor(off) 
The translation rules can also be used to create a Causal Component Model (CCM) [74, 76, 
161]. Figure 32 shows a CCM that models the translation rules. The interrelationships among the three 
STDs occur on the basis of causation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, the switch has a causal relationship with the motor because the switch causes a 
transition between the two motor states. Transitions for the three STDs occur concurrently on a 
synchronous basis. Thus, when the USER presses the switch, its transition from “off” to “on” occurs on 
the following Transition (T) cycle. The switch's “on” state then allows the motor to transition from “off” 
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to “on” during the next T cycle. We next create a numerical representation of component(states) by 
using the following component order {Switch, Temp_Sensor, Motor}, where off = 1, on = 2, safe = 1, 
and overheated = 2. 
Switch(off), 1.0.0. 
Switch(on), 2.0.0. 
Temp_Sensor(safe), 0.1.0. 
Temp_Sensor(overheated), 0.2.0. 
Motor(off), 0.0.1. 
Motor(on), 0.0.2. 
We use the numerical Component(States) to create a numerical representation of the translation 
rules, yielding:  
[1] USER(press) : 1.0.0.  2.0.0. 
[2] USER(releases) : 2.0.0.  1.0.0. 
[3] TEMP(>100) : 0.1.0.  0.2.0. 
[4] TEMP(<80) : 0.2.0.  0.1.0. 
[5] 2.0.0. ^ 0.1.0. : 0.0.1  0.0.2. 
[6] 1.0.0. : 0.0.2.  0.0.1. 
We apply absorption and propagation to numeric rules 5 and 6. Absorption results in [5] T.1 : 
2.1.1.  0.0.2. and [6] T.2 : 1.0.2.  0.0.1. and propagation results in [5] T.1 : 2.1.1.  2.1.2. and [6] 
T.2 : 1.0.2.  1.0.1. producing the final version of the translation rules: 
[1] USER(press) : 1.0.0.  2.0.0. 
[2] USER(releases) : 2.0.0.  1.0.0. 
[3] TEMP(>100) : 0.1.0.  0.2.0. 
[4] TEMP(<80) : 0.2.0.  0.1.0. 
[5] T.1 : 2.1.1.  2.1.2. 
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[6] T.2 : 1.0.2.  1.0.1. 
      2) Expand Translation Rules: The translation rules are expanded according to Expanded Rules 
Algorithm, resulting in the following explicit rules: 
[1] USER(press): 1.1.1.  2.1.1. 
[2] TEMP(>100): 1.1.1.  1.2.1. 
[3] USER(releases): 2.1.1.  1.1.1. 
[4] TEMP(>100): 2.1.1.  2.2.1. 
[5] USER(press): 1.2.1.  2.2.1. 
[6] TEMP(<80): 1.2.1.  1.1.1. 
[7] USER(releases): 2.2.1.  1.2.1. 
[8] TEMP(<80): 2.2.1.  2.1.1. 
[9] USER(press): 1.1.2.  2.1.2. 
[10] TEMP(>100): 1.1.2.  1.2.2. 
[11] USER(releases): 2.1.2.  1.1.2. 
[12] TEMP(>100): 2.1.2.  2.2.2. 
[13] USER(press): 1.2.2.  2.2.2. 
[14] TEMP(<80): 1.2.2.  1.1.2. 
[15] USER(releases): 2.2.2.  1.2.2. 
[16] TEMP(<80): 2.2.2.  2.1.2. 
[17] T.1: 2.1.1.  2.1.2. 
[18] T.2: 1.1.2.  1.1.1. 
[19] T.2: 1.2.2.  1.2.1. 
      3) Isolate Rules with Undesired Next States: Recall that, in our example, an undesired state is 
any system state where the motor is on (0.0.2.) while overheated (0.2.0.), resulting in a mask (0.2.2.). 
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When the zeroes are filled by the system’s state space, we get the two undesired system states: {1.2.2., 
2.2.2.}. The rules with the next states that are undesired are as follows:  
[10] TEMP(>100): 1.1.2.  1.2.2. 
[12] TEMP(>100): 2.1.2.  2.2.2. 
[13] USER(press): 1.2.2.  2.2.2. 
[15] USER(releases): 2.2.2.  1.2.2. 
      4) Profile Undesired Next States: The undesired next states are profiled, producing the following 
two profiles: 
State {EOD, EID, TOD, TID} 
1.2.2.{   2,      2,      1,       0  } 
2.2.2.{   2,      2,      0,       0  } 
Note that state 2.2.2. is non-recoverable because |TOD| = 0. Thus, the rules with non-
recoverable, undesired next states are as follows: 
[12] TEMP(>100): 2.1.2.  2.2.2. 
[13] USER(press): 1.2.2.  2.2.2. 
      5) Isolate Undesired Rules with Different End States: Of the two rules, 12 and 13, with non-
recoverable, undesired next states, it is rule 12 that transitions from an acceptable state (2.1.2.) to an 
undesired state (2.2.2.), and the cause is the temperature exceeding 100 degrees. We consider 2.1.2. 
acceptable because it does not have (2.2.2.), but rather, (2.1.2.) = {Switch(on), Temp_Sensor(safe), 
Motor(on)}. 
      6) Stakeholders Address ONB Problem: Translating rule 12 back to English, we have [12] 
TEMP(>100): {Switch(on), Temp_Sensor(safe), Motor(on)}  {Switch(on), 
Temp_Sensor(overheated), Motor(on)}. This rule indicates, to the stakeholders, that no provision has 
been specified for what happens if the motor overheats WHILE it is in an “on” state.  
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As an example, we will correct the requirements to address the ONB that results in the 
undesired state by adding a fourth requirement: RQ4: The motor shall turn off if the temperature exceeds 
100 degrees. Without retracing the entire process with the addition of RQ4, we will only show the key 
differences, beginning with the new set of translation rules: 
[1] USER(press) : Switch(off)  Switch(on) 
[2] USER(releases) : Switch(on)  Switch(off) 
[3] TEMP(>100) : Temp_Sensor(safe)  Temp_Sensor(overheated) 
[4] TEMP(<80) : Temp_Sensor(overheated)  Temp_Sensor(safe) 
[5] Switch(on) ^ Temp_Sensor(safe) : Motor(off)  Motor(on) 
[6] Switch(off) : Motor(on)  Motor(off)  
[7] Temp_Sensor(overheated) : Motor(on)  Motor(off) 
Translation rules are converted into numeric rules (note the extra [7] T.3 rule, defining the new 
constraint from RQ4): 
[1] USER(press) : 1.0.0.  2.0.0. 
[2] USER(releases) : 2.0.0.  1.0.0. 
[3] TEMP(>100) : 0.1.0.  0.2.0. 
[4] TEMP(<80) : 0.2.0.  0.1.0. 
[5] T.1 : 2.1.1.  2.1.2. 
[6] T.2 : 1.0.2.  1.0.1. 
[7] T.3 : 0.2.2.  0.0.1. 
When expanded and sorted for undesired next states, we obtain: 
[10] TEMP(>100): 1.1.2.  1.2.2. 
[12] TEMP(>100): 2.1.2.  2.2.2. 
[13] USER(press): 1.2.2.  2.2.2. 
[15] USER(releases): 2.2.2.  1.2.2. 
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State profiling on the next states produces: 
State {EOD, EID, TOD, TID} 
1.2.2.{   2,      2,      2,       0  } 
2.2.2.{   2,      2,      1,       0  } 
Note that state 2.2.2. is now recoverable (|TOD| = 1). There is now a system rule that recovers 
2.2.2., [21] T.3: 2.2.2.  2.2.1., which states that if the motor overheats while it is on, it will 
automatically turn off. This rule did not exist before because there was no requirement to address this 
scenario. 
Support Tool Implementation 
A support tool was developed to implement the approach, allowing us to conduct case studies 
with various sets of requirements. The tool is a Windows application that was implemented in Visual C# 
and uses a third-party graphing library called Graphviz to generate a graphical representation of the 
CCM. Among the various features the tool offers, it enables the entering of component--states, generates 
tanslation rules, and automatically expands those rules. The tool can even display a color-coded Labeled 
Transition System (LTS) from the expanded rules. The colors differentiate the environmental causes (as 
red transitions) from the system causes (in black). Stakeholders can manually simulate the CCM 
behavior by clicking the environmental causes associated with that CCM. Other displays include an LTS 
that only has the states transitioned by the environmental causes and those states transitioned by the 
system. The tool generates the results of each step in the form of an unformatted report. The tool is 
designed in such a way that allows for future expansion and modifications. This is achieved by 
partitioning functionalities into reusable components (objects) and global dedicated data structures 
(structs and lists). The tool’s architecture uses several data structures to contain the data in its various 
forms as it is processed from step to step.  
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These include, but not limited to, separate data structures for translation rules, rules with 
undesired next states, and rules non-recoverable undesired next states. The data structures are shared, on 
a read/write basis, between data processing classes, which are also self-contained objects. This facilitates 
expandability since no data is tied specifically to a given process. Thus if, in the future, there is a new 
process to perform on the translation rules, that new process would simply access the translation rule 
data structure without the need to modify another process. This makes the tool both an implementation 
to the state profiling approach, and a development platform for future approach improvements. 
Excavator Case Study 
We will now show how the approach can be applied to a real-world embedded system. We also 
analyze the subsystem of a small excavator that is commercially sold and rented to consumers for 
residential use with landscaping projects. The subsystem in question is part of the excavator’s operator-
safety feature. The following subset of requirements is taken from an actual, commercially available 
excavator. For proprietary reasons, we will forgo the name of the product and rephrase the requirements 
in generic statements. We begin with some of the Non-Functional Requirements (NFR), followed by the 
Functional Requirements (FR) which specify the desired behavior of the safety feature. The operator-
safety feature will consist of the following: 
 NFR1: A seat-bar which keeps the operator restricted to the seat. The seat-bar operates similarly to the 
bar restraint on a rollercoaster. 
NFR2: A seat switch which is turned on when the operator is seated.   
NFR3: A cab door switch which is turned on when the cab door is closed.  
NFR4: A means to activate/deactivate the drive system which enables the machine to move.  
NFR5: A means to activate/deactivate the bucket system which controls the excavator’s earth-moving 
bucket. Figure 33 shows the relative position of the components described by the requirements. 
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Figure 34. Component State Grid (CSG), used to enter  
the component states entry table 
 
 
 
Figure 33. The components used in the excavator case study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The feature shall behave as follows: 
FR1: When the operator is sitting in the seat, the machine's drive system shall be active, 
allowing the excavator to be driven between destinations. 
FR2: If the door is closed and the seat bar is down, the machine's bucket system shall be active, 
allowing operation of the earth-moving bucket.  
FR3: If someone outside the cab opens the door, the bucket system shall be inactive, preventing 
bucket operation. 
From the requirements, we determine and enter the components and their respective states, as 
shown in Figure 34. 
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Figure 35. The Translation Rules Grid (TRG), used to create  
the translation rules by the stakeholders 
Note from Figure 34 that we refer to the entire drive system as “Drive.” The scope of the 
requirements involve the activation and deactivation of the drive system. Therefore, for our purposes, it 
is sufficient to black-box the drive system without concerning ourselves with its operational details. The 
same applies to the bucket system. This black-boxing helps manage state explosion. A numerical value 
is assigned to each component--state based on the ordinal values of the component rows and the state 
columns. The next two steps in the translation-rule creation are achieved in a separate grid, shown in 
Figure 35. The creation of these rules is achieved by clicking and dragging the desired component--state 
from the Component State Grid to the Translation Rules Grid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rules are formatted according to the column headings in Figure 35: Cause : Pre Comp(state) 
 Next Comp(state). Numerical representation of the translation rules becomes 
  Rules caused by the environment (the operator) 
[1] OPERATOR(inSeat) : 1.0.0.0.0.  2.0.0.0.0. 
[2] OPERATOR(outOfSeat) : 2.0.0.0.0.  1.0.0.0.0. 
[3] OPERATOR(pullsSBDown) : 0.1.0.0.0.  0.2.0.0.0. 
[4] OPERATOR(putsSBUp) : 0.2.0.0.0.  0.1.0.0.0. 
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[5] OPERATOR(closesDoor) : 0.0.1.0.0.  0.0.2.0.0. 
[6] OPERATOR(opensDoor) : 0.0.2.0.0.  0.0.1.0.0. 
[7] T.1 : 2.0.0.1.0.  0.0.0.2.0. 
[8] T.2 : 0.0.1.0.2.  0.0.0.0.1. 
[9] T.3 : 0.2.2.0.1.  0.0.0.0.2.  
With five components, each having two possible states, the complete system state space consists 
of 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 = 32. When expanded, the 9 rules above become 96 rules caused by the environment 
and 20 rules caused by the system, for a total of 116 expanded rules. Like the translation rules above, 
each expanded rule is numbered. Space prevents listing the 116 expanded rules. Each rule maps a given 
present state into the next state. For example, expanded rule number 61: OPERATOR(inSeat) : 
1.1.2.1.2.  2.1.2.1.2. specifies the transition from present state 1.1.2.1.2. to next state 2.1.2.1.2. The 
question is whether there is a rule that terminates into an undesired state. Therefore, we analyze every 
next state that happens to be an undesired state using state profiling to determine if that undesired state 
is system recoverable. There are three undesired states with which we are concerned: 
{SeatSwitch(off), Drive(active)}  Mask: 1.0.0.2.0. 
{Door(open), Bucket(active)}      Mask: 0.0.1.0.2. 
{SeatBar(up), Bucket(active)}      Mask: 0.1.0.0.2. 
  Note that, in each case, we are only stating the two component--states that define an undesired 
state. We want to verify that the Drive is not active unless someone is in the seat, that the Bucket is not 
active if the Door is open, and that the Bucket is not active if the SeatBar is up. The mask for each state 
is shown; again, the 0 represents a don’t-care for the corresponding component--state. Using the masks 
and screening for a |TOD| = 0 state profile, we obtain the following list of non-recoverable, undesired 
states. 
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State Profiles: {EOD, EID, TOD, TID} 
1.1.2.2.1.{3, 3, 0, 0} {SeatSwitch(off), Drive(active)}   
1.2.1.2.1.{3, 3, 0, 1} {SeatSwitch(off), Drive(active)}   
1.1.1.2.1.{3, 3, 0, 1} {SeatSwitch(off), Drive(active)} 
1.2.2.2.2.{3, 3, 0, 1} {SeatSwitch(off), Drive(active)} 
1.1.2.2.2.{3, 3, 0, 0} {SeatSwitch(off), Drive(active)} 
State Profiles: {EOD, EID, TOD, TID} 
1.1.2.1.2.{3, 3, 0, 0} {SeatBar(up), Bucket(active)} 
2.1.2.2.2.{3, 3, 0, 1} {SeatBar(up), Bucket(active)} 
State Profiles: {EOD, EID, TOD, TID} 
1.2.1.2.2.{3, 3, 1, 0} {Door(open), Bucket(active)} 
1.1.1.2.2.{3, 3, 1, 0} {Door(open), Bucket(active)} 
1.1.1.1.2.{3, 3, 1, 0} {Door(open), Bucket(active)} 
2.1.1.1.2.{3, 3, 2, 0} {Door(open), Bucket(active)} 
1.2.1.1.2.{3, 3, 1, 0} {Door(open), Bucket(active)} 
2.2.1.1.2.{3, 3, 2, 0} {Door(open), Bucket(active)} 
2.1.1.2.2.{3, 3, 1, 1} {Door(open), Bucket(active)} 
2.2.1.2.2.{3, 3, 1, 1} {Door(open), Bucket(active)} 
      Note that the undesired states {Door(open), Bucket(active)} are recoverable as indicated by 
their state profiles (|TOD| = 1 or 2),   because the contiguity for recovering from that undesired state is 
addressed in the requirements, namely FR3: If someone outside the cab opens the door, the bucket 
system shall be inactive, preventing the bucket’s operation. As we will see, no such contingencies are 
addressed for the other two undesired states. We next determine the rules that terminate at the non-
recoverable, undesired states.  
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We focus on rules with next states of 1.1.2.2.1.{3, 3, 0, 0} {SeatSwitch(off), Drive(active)}, 
which consist of rules 27, 40, and 44. 
[27] OPERATOR(closesDoor): 1.1.1.2.1.  1.1.2.2.1. 
[40] OPERATOR(outOfSeat): 2.1.2.2.1.  1.1.2.2.1. 
[44] OPERATOR(putsSBUp): 1.2.2.2.1.  1.1.2.2.1. 
Note that rule 40 is the only one of the three rules where the SeatSwitch changes from 
SeatSwitch(on) to SeatSwitch(off). If we translate rule 40 into a NL, we get OPERATOR(outOfSeat): 
{SeatSwitch(on), SeatBar(up), Door(closed), Drive(active), Bucket(inactive)}  {SeatSwitch(off), 
SeatBar(up), Door(closed), Drive(active), Bucket(inactive)} Note that rule 40 defines what causes the 
transition from an acceptable state {SeatSwitch(on), Drive(active)} to an undesired state 
{SeatSwitch(off), Drive(active)}. This transition is the one we are interested in preventing. Specifically, 
rule 40 reveals that the undesired state occurs when the driver gets up from the seat while the drive is 
active. A review of the requirements reveals that none of them state what happens if the driver gets up 
from the seat AFTER the drive has been activated.  
The requirements only specify that the driver needs to sit down to activate the drive, however, 
they do not specify what should happen if the driver were to stand up. Perhaps, this contingency was 
assumed (ambiguous) or simply missed (incompleteness). If we determine all the other rules that 
terminate at a non-recoverable {SeatSwitch(off), Drive(active)} state while transitioning from an 
acceptable state, we find that there are three other rules that reveal a similar scenario with the same 
cause as rule 40, the operator moving from the seat once drive has been activated. The reason that four 
rules reveal the same cause for an undesired state is due to the fact that there is more than one transition 
path into which the undesired state can be reached. The stakeholders should respond to this information 
by correcting the requirements so that the requirements explicitly state what should happen if the driver 
moves from the seat once the drive has been activated. If we determine the rules that terminate in an 
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{SeatBar(up), Bucket(active)} state, we find two rules that define a change from {SeatBar(dwon), 
Bucket(active)} to {SeatBar(up), Bucket(active)}. They are rules 68 and 95:  
[68] OPERATOR(putsSBUp): {SeatSwitch(off), SeatBar(down), Door(closed), Drive(inactive), 
Bucket(active)}  {SeatSwitch(off), SeatBar(up), Door(closed), Drive(inactive), 
Bucket(active)} 
[95] OPERATOR(putsSBUp): {SeatSwitch(on), SeatBar(down), Door(closed), Drive(inactive), 
Bucket(active)}  {SeatSwitch(on), SeatBar(up), Door(closed), Drive(inactive), 
Bucket(active)} 
Rules 68 and 95 reveal a similar problem as the rules surrounding the SeatSwitch: the 
requirements do not specify what happens if the operator lifts the SeatBar after the Bucket has been 
made active. Again, the stakeholders would correct this situation by explicitly specifying what should 
happen if the SeatBar is raised. 
Observations from a Follow-up Study 
This case study uses the requirements for an elevator system [163]. The requirements was 
prepared as a 78 page document, which includes functional and non-functional requirements, and some 
degree of analysis/design as expressed in UML Sequence, State, and Collaboration diagrams. For our 
purposes, we focused on the 25 natural language functional requirements, listed in the document. Space 
does not allow a complete listing of the requirements, both before and after the CCM approach was 
applied. In summary, the requirements describe a system that takes cab requests from buttons within the 
elevator cab and on each floor being serviced. The system is to deliver a cab to a floor where a request is 
made and then deliver the cab to the floor where the operator desires to go. Other artifacts managed 
include the doors, and an emergency switch in the cab. We modeled the requirements in a CCM, and 
analyzed them according to the steps used in the excavator case study. We will give an overview of how 
the CCM approach was utilized and what the approach exposed, from an off-nominal standpoint.  
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The elevator system consists of 18 components, as explicitly listed in the document. Each 
component has a detail description, from which we deduced two states for 8 components, while ten 
components had only the “on” state listed. For example, the components “Emergency Bell Button” and 
“Emergency Bell” had only the states “Pressed”, and “Ring” respectively. There was no mention of the 
“Emergency Bell Button” not-pressed, or the “Emergency Bell” not-ringing. One inherent benefit of the 
CCM is that since each component has its own STD, and each STD should be completed, we are forced 
to account for at least two component states (e.g. {EmergencyBell(Ringing), 
EmergencyBell(NotRinging)}), instead of the one component state specified in the document. It can be 
argued that having to account for components states that are not explicitly listed, is one way to address 
incompleteness, and ambiguities in a requirements document. Accounting for these unspecified 
component states, gave us a total of 18 components with 2 component states each, giving us a total of 
2
18
 (262,144) system states. Considering that each of those system states has at least two transition edges 
(at least one in-degree and one out-degree), this gives us a lot or transition paths to examine, both 
automatically. 
As previously mentioned, the CCM approach allows us to reduce a large number of system 
states, by treating components states as edges, rather than nodes. Thus, input sensors, of which there 
were 9, are treated as causes, and not component states. This reduced the number of system states to 92 
(512). We were able to reduce the number of states further by considering that there are 6 user indicators 
listed as components (e.g. Load Bell, Emergency Bell, Floor Number Display, etc.). Indicators are open-
ended, meaning that they do not cause a transition in the system. Since we are interested in transition 
paths that can facilitate an ONB, we can ignore open-end indicators that will not contribute to the 
number of paths.  This left us with 3 components {Controller, ElevatorEngine, DoorOpenDevice}. Note 
that this means the system will consist of one controller and two actuators, similar to example D of 
Figure 19. The Controller ended having 5 states, while the two actuators ended up with two states each.  
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This gave us a total of (2 x 2 x 5) 20 system states, compared to the initial 262,144 states we 
would have had without taking advantage of CCM’s flexibility in representing different levels of 
abstraction. It should be noted that while it seems that the large discrepancy between 262,144 states and 
20 states, would result in a loss of valuable information, the 20 states still capture the interaction 
between the controller and the key actuators in the system, where ONBs will tend to be a problem.  
In our analysis of the Elevator case study, we looked at how the requirements addressed 
undesired states. The CCM approach generates all 20 possible system states, a subset of which would be 
considered non-acceptable (undesired states). We define an undesired system state as one that represents 
an undesired combination of component states. For example, the system state 
{DoorOpenDevice(DoorsOpened), ElevatorEngine(MoveCab), Contr(reachedRequestedFloor)}, has 
both the door opened while the cab is moving. This state should, ideally, not be reachable, or if 
reachable, it should at least be recoverable by the system. After applying the CCM approach to the 
elevator requirements, we divided the resulting analysis into two categories; 1) Potential ONB problems 
related to undesired states, 2) Potential ONB problems related to system behavior. The following list 
summarizes the ONB problems related to undesired states. 
• Number of undesired states exposed - 7 
• Number of undesired states that are reachable –  4 
• Number of undesired states that can potentially be caused exclusively by the environment –3 
• Number of undesired states that the system could not recover from – 5 
Note that in spite of only 20 possible states, there is still about 55% that would classify as 
potentially problematic. This is because, during the expansion of requirements, the CCM approach will 
produce all the possible combinatorial system states; not just those system states implied in the 
requirements. The following summarizes two of the five potential ONBs related to system behaviors 
exposed.  
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An unintended behavior is that pressing an emergency stop button stops the cab movement 
monetarily, only to have the system start the cab moving again. This is because the requirements 
specifies that the elevator engine stops upon pressing the emergency button, but says nothing about 
halting the “send cab request”, which starts the engine cab in the first. A person reading the requirement 
may assume that that both the engine and its request to send a cab are both tied to the emergency button. 
Our approach raised this question, forcing the stakeholders to explicitly state the exact result of pressing 
the emergency button. 
Another unintended behavior is that the doors may get stuck in a 3 second cycle of opening and 
closing. One requirement, labeled F6 states: “A cab’s door opening device opens its doors when it 
reaches a floor that has an active summon.” While another requirement (F10) states: “After the doors of 
a cab have been open for 3 seconds, its door opening device closes them.” No requirement explicitly 
states that the opening and closing occurs once, because the active summon state should be satisfied, and 
no longer active when the floor is reached.  
The elevator requirements seem to rely substantially on common knowledge about elevator 
operation. Perhaps the stakeholders behind the requirements did not feel the need to fill the requirements 
with “trivial” knowledge. This is a common occurrence, and results in requirements lacking explicitness. 
We realize that the process of translating NL requirements into CCM can compound ambiguities, due to 
how the user of CCM interprets the requirements. However, the important thing to note is that the mere 
act of trying to formalize a set of NL requirements into a model, and then analyzing the behavior of that 
model, will raise questions that otherwise would not come to mind. Such questions were raised in the 
elevator case study. 
Discussion and Limitations of SPA 
  We have introduced a new requirement verification method that can detect and help correct the 
off-nominal behavior susceptibility. Our case study shows that the proposed approach is able to expose 
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off-nominal behaviors for further correction. This section discusses further observations and lessons 
learned from our study as well as the limitations of our approach.   
1) The approach can typically expose ONBs that are not obvious from reading the requirements 
and therefore beneficial to domain expects who may have a tendency to assume common 
knowledge about their domain of expertise while describing a system’s desired behavior. 
2) The distinction between environmental and system rules allows for isolating behaviors produced 
by a human operator, proving to be beneficial because humans are the biggest perpetrators of 
ONBs. 
3) By taking a rules-based approach, we are able to readily translate a set of natural language 
requirements into a format that can be modeled, formally analyzed, and readily interpreted 
without prior training in a formal language.  
4) The approach allows for simulation of the CCM. A user can make all the corrections via 
interaction with the CCM, as opposed to interacting with a large LTS representation, which 
helps manage visual-state explosion. 
5) There are also lessons learned about the question type that should be asked during the elicitation 
phase. These questions include “When specifying the behavior of a given component, what 
should the other components be doing; does it matter?” “When specifying a component’s state, 
should the opposite state be specified?” In many cases, the answer is yes because addressing 
these questions can initially reduce the number of zeroes in the translation rules which, in turn, 
reduces the number of ambiguities. 
While our case study showed promising results, there are some limitations with our approach in 
terms of knowledge representation and reasoning. For knowledge representation, the CCM model itself 
could be improved by broadening the definition of component--state to include actions. We could follow 
the same component(state) format but expand it to component(state/action).  
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To a degree, we already include actions in practice because we can express a component in the 
state of performing an action.  For knowledge reasoning, we can also broaden the direction of research 
and place more emphasis on exposing ambiguities outside the context of those related to ONBs. Another 
perceived limitation is that the approach does not allow for the specification of transition guards. 
However, the goal has been to maintain a level of abstraction that is high enough for requirements, and 
there is already the ability to logically AND causes together which can be used as a logical equivalence 
of a guard. Through further case studies with our approach, we will have a clearer understanding about 
if provisions for guards are necessary. 
In the area of application, we demonstrate that the approach has the ability to raise specific 
questions about how a system will behave as specified. There is still some degree of stakeholder 
interaction required, however, because we are operating in the requirement phase, where stakeholder 
involvement is expected. We do not think that the approach needs to be completely automated, nor do 
we think that the approach is limited to smaller requirement sets. Finally, we address how state 
explosion could be minimized by reducing the number of system states and treating some components 
strictly as causes instead of states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 120 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This dissertation is the result of endeavoring to automate requirements verification. The various 
approaches conceived and explored can be categorized under the research heading of knowledge 
representation and reasoning. Overall, this research has produced a requirements representation and 
reasoning framework that can be used as either a front–end to an existing formal approach such as 
model checking, or as a standalone techniques that can be extended to expose various defects. Thus, the 
major contributions and merits occur in both how requirements can be represented and how that 
representation can be automatically reasoned upon. We now summarize the merits in these areas. 
Merits in Requirements Representation 
In CCM, we have a requirements model that can explicitly represent separate concerns. These 
include: 
 The concurrent behaviors of individual systems components. 
 The state transition causes originating from the system’s operating environment. 
 The state transition causes originating from the systems components. 
 The set of rules defining how the system behaves in response to the environment. 
 The set of rules defining how the system reacts to the environment. 
Merits in Requirements Automated Reasoning  
CCM is a rule-based approach with an IF-THEN structure that is both intuitive to most users. 
This allows for both the manual and automated manipulation of the rules. This includes: 
 The rules can be humanly read or written, without prior training in logic and set theory. 
 The rules can be cascaded and/or combined to form Kripke structures, LTSs, or Petri-nets.  
 The rules can be traversed through forward chaining to allow for path traversal analysis. 
 The rules can be used to create an expert system, which in turn can be queried. 
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 The rules themselves can be represented numerically, which allows for the limited mathematical 
manipulation of the rules.  
 The numerical representation of the rules also allows for the direct property checking of those 
rules.  
 There can be a direct one-to-one mapping of rules to requirements, which facilitates the 
translation of rules back to requirements. 
 State Profiling allows for the direct property checking of individual states. 
Merits in Modeling Separation of Concerns 
Maintaining the separation of environmental and system causes greatly facilitates the ability to 
isolate one or more of these concerns for analysis purposes. For example, if desired, we can readily 
determine what sequence of events from the environment will result in a given state. Or we can readily 
determine which component will have the highest impact on the system if its behavior were to change. 
Or we can readily determine conflicting behaviors based on whether or not a given reaction state is 
associated with more than one system rule.  
Merits in Addressing System ONB Susceptibility 
There is merit in trying to address the off-nominal behaviors from a system’s standpoint. In this 
research the emphasis has been on the exposure and elimination of system ONB susceptibility. This 
takes a different approach to the more common endeavor of preventing ONBs from arising in the 
operating environment. While the prevention of ONBs is equally important, the system susceptibility 
question is tied to the question of system robustness. Thus, in eliminating ONB susceptibility, the 
system is made more robust and foolproof to the actions of human operators. In applications where an 
embedded system is expected to greatly interact with a human operator, making the system foolproof 
can be critical. 
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Merits as a Model Checker Front End 
There is merit in providing a front end to a model checker that is specifically geared toward 
model checking requirements. This is valuable since model checking is primarily used in formally 
verifying hardware, with lesser applications in software verification, and even less use in requirements 
engineering. CCM represents an effort toward making model checking accessible to non-technical users 
such as stakeholders who are domain expects but not engineers. 
Impact of this Research 
There are two immediate areas for potential impact resulting from this research. They are 
stakeholder involvement, and the addressing of ONBs. We will now address the two immediate areas 
individually.  
Stakeholder Involvement 
It is hoped that this research will have an impact on stakeholder involvement during the 
requirements engineering phase of a project. Quite often there is a division between stakeholder and 
requirements engineer that coincides with the division between informal and formal representations of 
the system being specified. Non-technical stakeholders tend to communicate their desires using natural 
language, whereas requirements engineers try to formalize those desires, in an effort to prevent them for 
the more formal design phase. There is also the question of verification, which is preferably done using 
a more automated approach. To achieve this automation, the requirements must be formalized. 
Furthermore, there is the question of communicating the formal verification results back to the non-
technical stakeholder. Ideally, the gap between stakeholder and engineer should be eliminated, and at 
least greatly reduced. 
Addressing ONBs 
Scanning the available literature on the ONB problem reveals that not enough research is being 
performed to specifying systems foolproof to their operating environment.  
 123 
The fool proofing often comes as an afterthought, typically addressed at the time of 
implementation with off nominal testing [133]. Sometimes a potential ONB problem is not caught and 
addressed in-house, before the product is released. The desired impact from this research is that the 
ONBP be addressed as early as the requirements phase. This would not only reduce the cost with 
addressing it downstream, but raise awareness of an ONB problem when the stakeholders are still 
involved in the development process. 
Future Directions 
Each of the above mentioned merits can be developed further by others in the requirements 
engineering field. To build upon this research, others can perform improvements upon the approaches as 
presented here and/or extend the research into various directions.  
Potential Improvements 
Right now the intent is maintaining the representation at a very high level of abstraction where 
primarily the causal relationships between components are captured and represented. This has proven to 
be sufficient when representing requirements, where the emphasis is on what the system is support to 
do. This also keeps the translation from NL requirements to CCM rules as cognitive friendly as possible. 
However, there may be a future need to obtain greater expressiveness within the CCM rules, at the 
potential expense of ease-of-use. A move in that direction would trend the CCM approach toward a rule-
based design modeling language. This could be facilitated by moving away from a stand-alone support 
tool, to a plugin for a Simulink toolbox such as state-flow. The CCM could then in turn be converted 
directly into code, using Simulink’s capability to automatically build implementations from models. 
Another potential improvement is in the change from the manual to the automatic translation from NL to 
CCM rules. A complete turnkey translation would require extensive work in integrating Natural 
Language Processing techniques.  
With the present state of NLP technology, there would likely still be a need to utilize a human in 
the loop to some degree.  
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Therefore, a sufficient compromise may be to utilize a technique called Part-Of-Speech Tagging 
(POS Tagging) [166], in which a NL sentence is parsed and tagged according to its grammatical 
components. For example, Part-Of-Speech Tagger will take a sentence such as: 
The grand jury commented on a number of other topics. 
And tag the grammatical parts of the sentence (see the key below): 
The/DT grand/JJ jury/NN commented/VBD on/IN a/DT number/NN of/IN other/JJ topics/NNS./. 
The CCM translation process centers around Component(States), which in many cases can take 
the form of Noun(Verb). POS tagging could determine the nouns and verbs of a sentence, wherein they 
could then be formatted into all the combinations of Noun(Verbs) and stuffed into a  drop down list of 
Component(States) that a stakeholder can choose from. The result, while not completely turn-key, 
would still aid the stakeholder in the sentence parsing portion of the translation process. For example, 
Given the following set of NL Requirements: 
R1: The bucket boom shall raise upward when the left pedal is pushed down with the driver’s toe. 
R2: The bucket boom shall lower downward when the left pedal is pushed down with the driver’s heel. 
R3: The bucket shall tip forward when the right  pedal is pushed down with the driver’s toe. 
R4: The bucket shall tip backward when the right pedal is pushed down with the driver’s heel. 
R5: The bucket boom shall become immovable if the seat switch is off. 
When Part-Of-Speech Tagging is applied to those requirements, we get the following set of 
grammatically tagged requirements (note the tags). 
R1 :  DT/ The  NN/ bucket  NN/ boom  MD/ shall  VB/ raise  RB/ upward  WRB/ when  DT/ the  VBD/ 
left  VB/ pedal  VBZ/ is  VBN/ pushed  RP/ down  IN/ with  DT/ the  NN/ driver NN/ ’ VBZ/ s  NN/ toe  
 R2 :  DT/ The  NN/ bucket  NN/ boom  MD/ shall  VB/ lower  RB/ downward  WRB/ when  DT/ the  
VBD/ left  VB/ pedal  VBZ/ is  VBN/ pushed  RP/ down  IN/ with  DT/ the  NN/ driver NN/ ’ VBZ/ s  
NN/ heel ./ .  
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R3 :DT/ The  NN/ bucket  MD/ shall  VB/ tip  RB/ forward  WRB/ when  DT/ the  RB/ right  VB/ pedal  
VBZ/ is  VBN/ pushed  RP/ down  IN/ with  DT/ the  NN/ driver NN/ ’ VBZ/ s  NN/ toe ./ .  
 R4 :  DT/ The  NN/ bucket  MD/ shall  VB/ tip  RB/ backward  WRB/ when  DT/ the  RB/ right  VB/ 
pedal  VBZ/ is  VBN/ pushed  RP/ down  IN/ with  DT/ the  NN/ driver NN/ ’ VBZ/ s  NN/ heel ./ .  
 R5 :  DT/ The  NN/ bucket  NN/ boom  MD/ shall  VB/ become  JJ/ immovable  IN/ if  DT/ the  NN/ 
seat  NN/ switch  VBZ/ is  RP/ off ./ .   
Note in the table below that we can separate the nouns (NN) from the verbs (VB). We could 
further combine instances of verb-adverb (VB – RB) into one term. 
Table 4. The nouns and verbs from the skid loader requirements 
Nouns (NN) Verbs (VB) - Adverbs (RB) 
bucket Raise - upward 
boom Lower - downward 
driver Tip - forward 
seat Tip - backward 
 
From the table we could provide drop downs for nouns and verbs and let the user select value, 
or when further research perhaps even create the Component(State) to a high percentage of accuracy. 
For example, we may be able to produce: boom(raiseUpward), boom(lowerDownward), 
bucket(tipForward), bucket(tipBackward). 
Other Directions 
Since CCM is rule based, one future direction is the creation of an expert system that would 
allow for the querying of requirements. Such querying could occur by either forward chaining or 
backward chaining the rules. Forward chaining could handle questions such as “What state will the 
system be in if the operator performs a given sequence of events?” Whereas backward chaining could 
handle questions such as “Given a system state what sequence of events would produce it?” Querying 
requirements would enable the use of Scenario Questions (one of the published concepts that 
contributed to CCM).  
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Another direction could be to perform property checking on the CCM rules themselves, rather 
than using a model checker. This could be achieved by using a combination of state profiles and the 
numerical representation of the rules. State profiles could be used when property checking states, 
whereas the numerical representation would be conducive to property checking rules. 
Overall, this research has resulted in a framework for the representation and analysis of 
requirements, with an emphasis on addressing the ONB problem from a system’s standpoint. The hope 
is that this framework can be further enhanced into other directions and applications. 
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